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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE PRESSURE ON
CFO JUDGMENTS
by
Carol C. Bishop
Through an experiment, this study examines the influence of social influence
pressure on the Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO’s) financial reporting decisions.
Specifically, I evaluate the impact of inappropriate obedience and compliance pressure
from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on the CFO’s propensity to make revisions to
financial results in order to meet an earnings target. This study also examines how
followership propensities and core self-evaluations (CSE) influence the pressure effects.
This study complements and expands archival research examining why CFOs appear to
participate in material accounting manipulations (Feng, Ge, Luo, & Shevlin, 2011; Ge,
Matsumoto, & Zhang, 2011).
The results of a between-subject experiment with 66 public company CFOs
indicate that obedience and compliance pressure significantly increase CFOs’ willingness
to revise their initial inventory adjustments in the direction preferred by the CEO.
Although compliance pressure did not create perceived pressure in the CFOs, it generated
an actual response (similar revision of the initial adjustment) similar to that under
obedience pressure. Compliance pressure’s strength reveals that CEO power is effective
even when soft tactics (i.e., requests) are utilized. The findings confirm the importance of
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the “tone at the top” in financial statement judgments. In addition, the findings reveal that
effective followers, who independently evaluate leadership’s requests, were less likely to
revise their initial adjustment. Finally, CFOs with more accounting experience were less
likely to revise their initial adjustment. This study has implications for corporate
governance mechanisms, including improving the effectiveness of CFOs as financial
statement monitors and improving CFO independence to alleviate pressure from the
CEO.

Keywords: financial statement fraud, material accounting misstatement, obedience
pressure, compliance pressure, followership theory, core self-evaluations, CFO, CEO.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Instead of viewing followers as the ‘good soldiers’ who carry
out commands dutifully, we need to view followers as the primary
defenders against toxic leaders or dysfunctional organizations.
The buck stops more with followers than leaders (Kelley, 2008, 14).
This study examines the effect of social influence pressure on the Chief Financial
Officer’s (CFO’s) financial reporting decisions. Specifically, I evaluate the impact of
inappropriate obedience and compliance pressure from the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) on the CFO’s propensity to revise financial results. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson,
and Neal (2010) call for research examining the behavioral factors motivating CFOs to
engage in fraudulent misreporting using leadership and organizational behavior research.
This study complements and expands archival research by examining why CFOs appear
to participate in material accounting manipulations (Feng et al., 2011; Ge, Matsumoto, &
Zhang, 2011).
This study also examines how followership propensities and core self-evaluations
(CSE) influence the pressure effects. Followership theory (Kelley, 1992) classifies
followers based on their degree of independence and activity, and offers a framework for
understanding CFO follower behavior (Amernic & Craig, 2010). CSE is composed of
self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and emotional stability (Judge, Locke, &
Durham, 1997). CSE influences behavior in reaction to organizational social stressors
(Bono & Judge, 2003; Harris, Harvey, & Kacmar, 2009).	
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Financial statement misreporting is a form of aggressive accounting, which, in the
extreme, reaches the level of financial statement fraud. Fraud schemes involve the
intentional misstatement or omission of material information in the organization’s
financial reports, including recording fictitious revenues, concealing liabilities or
expenses, and artificially inflating assets (ACFE, 2010). Motivations for manipulating the
financial reports of publicly owned companies are numerous, including financial rewards,
company survival, excessive executive egos, and meeting growth strategies. As a result,
prior literature has investigated the likelihood of committing financial statement fraud
from diverse perspectives, including criminology (Bucy, Formby, Raspanti, & Rooney,
2008), sociology/psychology (Ramamoorti, 2008), moral reasoning (Maroney &
McDevitt, 2008), and ethics (Shafer, 2002).
Academic accounting literature has focused considerable attention on the “fraud
triangle” as a tool for investigating the root causes of fraud from a psychological
perspective. The fraud triangle posits that three conditions are generally present when
fraud occurs: (1) an incentive or pressure, (2) an opportunity, and (3) rationalization or
attitude (Hogan, Rezaee, Riley, & Velury, 2008; Loebbecke, Eining, & Willingham,
1989). Likewise, accounting professionals feature the fraud triangle in their efforts to
detect fraud in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 2002). By separately evaluating each element of
the fraud triangle, auditors increase their effectiveness in making an overall fraud risk
assessment as a result of being more sensitive to opportunity and incentive clues (Wilks
& Zimbelman, 2004).
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Financial statement fraud is carried out by individuals who are either morally
inclined to commit fraud or individuals who set aside their moral convictions as a result
of pressure or incentives and then rationalize their decision. Thus, financial statement
fraud is at its core an individual decision. Due to its nature, financial statement fraud is
primarily planned and carried out by members of the top management team. In fact, the
SEC named the CEO and/or CFO for some level of involvement in 89 percent of
accounting fraud cases brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission from 19982007 (Beasley et al., 2010), with the CEO named in 72 percent of the cases and the CFO
in 65 percent. As head of the top management team (TMT), most corporate reporting
fraud schemes necessarily originate from the CEO’s actions or attitudes (Anderson &
Tirrell, 2004) because CEOs are responsible for the organization’s “tone at the top.”
CEOs can provide incentives and pressure to induce fraudulent behavior by other TMT
members.
CEOs have significant influence over fraudulent financial reporting, including all
three areas of the fraud triangle. However, their opportunity to directly commit fraud is
partially constrained since they do not have hands-on access to financial records. As a
result, CEOs typically need assistance from CFOs to carry out their intentions. Entrusted
with primary responsibility over financial statement preparation, CFOs play a pivotal role
in determining the quality of financial reporting (Aier, Comprix, Gunlock, & Lee, 2005).
CFOs also maintain internal controls and implement accounting principles and
procedures. The importance of the CFO’s fiduciary duties is evidenced by the
requirement in Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that CFOs (along with
CEOs) certify and approve the integrity of their company’s financial statements.
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Archival evidence (Beasley et al., 2010) indicates that both CEOs and CFOs are
the primary individuals implicated in financial statement fraud. Research also suggests
that CEO and CFO equity incentives significantly influence earnings management
activities and the likelihood of beating analysts’ forecasts (Jiang, Petroni, & Wang,
2010). CEOs occupy higher positions of power in the organization in comparison to
CFOs and, as a result, have the ability to influence the compensation, job security, and
future career opportunities of the CFO. In contrast, CFOs have primary responsibility and
influence over financial reporting. Thus, differences in CEO and CFO power and job
responsibilities suggest differences in motivations, rationales, and decision making in the
area of financial statement misreporting. In fact, Feng et al. (2011) find archival evidence
suggesting that CFOs are more likely to commit financial statement fraud in response to
perceived pressure from CEOs rather than for their own personal financial benefit. They
find higher CEO equity incentives and power in firms with material accounting
manipulations as compared to matched non-manipulation firms, but no difference in CFO
equity incentives across the two types of firms.
I use two types of social influence pressure to examine, in an experimental
setting, the extent to which CEO pressure is a motivating factor for CFOs to revise the
financial statements, which may be a first step toward committing financial statement
fraud (Beasley et al., 2010, finds that many frauds start small and become larger over
time). Obedience pressure and compliance pressure involve pressure from superiors.
Under these pressures, the supervisor’s influence comes in the form of either a directive
(obedience pressure) or a request (compliance pressure) to engage in an act.
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According to obedience theory, individuals who succumb to pressure (i.e., direct
orders) from a superior rationalize their fraudulent behavior by placing full responsibility
for the fraud on the authority figure (Davis, DeZoort, & Kopp, 2006). By rationalizing
that they had no choice but to follow a superior’s orders, they are able to reduce the stress
they might otherwise feel from engaging in unethical, immoral, or illegal behavior
conflicting with their individual values. Under obedience pressure, subordinate
individuals break from an autonomous state, become an agent for the authoritative
source, and deny responsibility (Milgram, 1963). Thus, obedience pressure links two
areas of the fraud triangle: pressure and rationalization.
Compliance pressure refers to an individual’s acquiescence in response to an
explicit or implicit request (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) from either a peer or superior
(DeZoort & Lord, 1997). Target individuals may have various underlying reasons for
accepting or adopting the influence of others, including gaining rewards or approval and
avoiding punishment or disapproval.
I explore the judgments of practicing CFOs in an experimental setting and
measure behavioral factors motivating their decisions. The experimental setting is
advantageous because motivations influencing the decisions of participants can be
evaluated directly using unobservable personality characteristics rather than indirectly
using observable proxies such as demographic characteristics (as is commonly done in
previous archival research). The use of practicing CFOs is advantageous because an
actual management manipulation decision can be evaluated directly in a case study rather
than indirectly using observable proxies such as accounting financial statement variables
typically used in archival research. Further, the use of practicing CFOs responds to the
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call for incorporating management, given its significant influence, into governance
studies (Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004).
The use of behavioral factors is advantageous because it is an attempt to directly look at
the psychological factors driving executive manipulation behavior and determining
managers’ style differences (Ge et al., 2011) rather than indirectly examining the inputs
and outputs of the “black box” (Hambrick, 2007). Thus, this paper attempts to expand the
theories (psychology) and research methods (experimental) typically used to understand
the important problem of financial statement manipulation, as suggested by Carcello,
Hermanson, and Ye (2011).
In this study, current CFOs participated in an experiment involving a hypothetical
CFO’s earnings manipulation decision. Using a between-subjects manipulation, I used
three levels of CEO pressure (obedience pressure from a CEO who tells the CFO to
revise an estimate, compliance pressure from a CEO who asks the CFO to revise an
estimate, and a control group where the CEO does not pressure the CFO). Additionally, I
measured personality variables (followership and core self-evaluations) for potential
moderating effects. The dependent variable was the participant’s propensity to revise an
inventory adjustment decision.
The results indicate that obedience and compliance pressure significantly increase
CFOs’ willingness to revise their inventory adjustments. Additionally, obedience and
compliance pressure produce similar CFO responses (i.e., revisions to meet the earnings
target) despite differences in the CFOs’ perception of the degree of pressure inherent in
the demand or request. The findings confirm the importance of “tone at the top” and of
corporate culture surrounding earnings targets in financial statement judgments. The
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predictions for responsibility assessments, that CFOs who succumbed to CEO pressure
would assign responsibility for their decision to the CEO, were not supported. Instead,
CFOs under pressure assigned primary responsibility for their decision to themselves and
provided qualitative evidence of their sense of responsibility for financial statement
decisions. Overall, CFOs found a revision of the estimate to be legal and neither ethical
or unethical. However, the CFOs who did not revise their estimate judged such a change
to be significantly more illegal and unethical than CFOs who did revise.
The hypothesized effect for followership (moderating the effect of pressure) was
not found. However, I did find that effective followers, who independently evaluate
leadership’s requests, were less likely to revise their adjustment. The findings did not
support the prediction for CSE; the participants’ levels of CSE did not influence their
resistance to pressure or their propensity to revise their adjustment. Finally, CPAs with
more accounting experience were less likely to revise their initial adjustments. This study
has implications for corporate governance mechanisms, including improving the
effectiveness of CFOs as financial statement monitors and improving CFO independence
to alleviate pressure from the CEO.
This paper enhances the study of social influence effects by using followership
theory to investigate how CFO behavior is influenced by individual factors such as
personality and passive/proactive followership schema. Additionally, followership may
enrich our understanding of how CFOs as followers can fulfill an ethical watchdog role
(Kelley, 1998) and contribute to corporate governance. By encouraging thoughtful
dissent, organizations are more likely to achieve better decisions (Bennis, 2010) and
potentially reduce fraud. A review of the accounting literature indicates that the construct
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of followership has not yet been empirically tested in an accounting context. This paper’s
investigation of followership propensities will lay the groundwork for future research into
accounting practitioner followership propensities.
Additionally, this paper extends the study of psychological characteristics
influencing CFO decision-making by examining the influence of core self-evaluations
(CSE) on an earnings manipulation decision. CSE is a higher-order personality construct
composed of at least four specific traits: self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and
emotional stability (Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997). This dispositional trait
subconsciously influences individual perceptions and behavior (Bono & Judge, 2003) and
moderates individual reactions to organizational social stressors (Harris, Harvey, &
Kacmar, 2009).
In summary, this research is expected to improve our understanding of the factors
ultimately contributing to an individual’s decision to set aside personal beliefs and
engage in fraud (although the current study examines a softer setting than outright fraud),
including the attitudes and rationalizations that result in the decision to engage in
fraudulent misreporting, and the psyche of individuals involved in fraudulent reporting
(Beasley et al., 2010). Additionally, this research has implications for potential
improvements in the effectiveness of CFOs as financial statement monitors by exploring
thoughtful dissent. Lastly, this research extends corporate governance research on CFOs
and provides support for the need to improve CFO independence to alleviate
inappropriate pressure from the CEO.
The next sections provide background information and develop the hypotheses.
Subsequent sections describe the methodology, results, and conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
As noted above, SEC fraud-related enforcement cases typically cite the CEO
and/or CFO for some level of involvement in the misreporting (Beasley et al., 2010).
Considerable research has investigated top management team fraud resulting from
financial incentives from bonuses or equity-based compensation (Armstrong, Jagolinzer,
& Larcker, 2010; Burns & Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson, 2007). However,
the motives, pressures, and incentives of top management team members vary across
titles. For example, research has found that CEOs are primary instigators (31.9 percent)
and primary financial beneficiaries (42.5 percent) of accounting manipulations (Feng et
al., 2011). But, CFOs are not primary instigators (17.5 percent) or primary financial
beneficiaries (7.5 percent) of accounting manipulations (Feng et al., 2011). Indirect
archival evidence leads Feng et al. (2011) to conclude that CFO involvement in
accounting manipulations is more likely to be due to CEO pressure rather than personal
financial benefits to the CFO.
Various types of pressures create stress within accountants and affect their
attitudes and performance (see DeZoort & Lord, 1997 for a review). Drawing from the
social psychology literature, the behavioral accounting literature has examined the
organizational-related pressures faced by individuals in firms, including three types of
social influence pressure (obedience, compliance, and conformity). Two types of social
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influence pressure involve pressure from superiors: obedience pressure and compliance
pressure. Under these pressures, the supervisor’s influence comes in the form of either a
directive (obedience pressure) or a request (compliance pressure) to engage in an act.
Conformity pressure results from pressure to act in accordance with one’s peers in order
to avoid appearing different.
The present study seeks to better understand accounting manipulation through the
scenario of CEOs as leaders and CFOs as followers through a leadership and
organizational behavior research lens. Some individuals are predisposed to intentional
dishonesty as a result of attitude, character, or ethics, while other individuals are able to
rationalize committing a fraudulent act. Organizational corruption is often explained by a
combination of rationalization tactics used by individuals to justify their actions and
socialization tactics used to induce newcomers into accepting the unethical practices as
normal (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004).
Obedience Pressure
In an environment in which there is perceived opportunity to commit fraud,
obedience theory may enrich our understanding of the potential pressures and
rationalizations that motivate individuals to commit fraudulent acts. Obedience pressure
is a form of social influence pressure where individuals are compelled to submit to an
order from an authority figure. Of the three social pressures, obedience pressure typically
is most potent because of the power a hierarchical supervisor holds over an employee.
Thus, CEO pressure can result in a great deal of stress, particularly regarding the
potential negative impact on job and career (DeZoort & Lord, 1994; DeZoort & Lord,
1997).

	
  

11
The significant influence of legitimate authorities can override individual
predispositions (Blass, 1991; Milgram, 1963). Legitimate power arises from one’s
hierarchical position in the organization and depends on the willingness of subordinates
to defer to demands (French & Raven, 1959). While obeying the directives of authorities
such as parents and teachers is beneficial for children because of the authority figures’
greater knowledge and their control over rewards and punishments, adults also reap the
practical advantages of obedience to authority.
The origins of obedience theory can be traced to Stanley Milgram’s (1963)
experiments, which measured participants’ willingness to obey an authority figure
directing them to apparently administer electric shocks to others, in conflict with their
personal conscience. Milgram’s study found that participants obeyed more often than
expected, despite the apparent pain caused by the treatments, leading to the theory that
obedience may be a deeply ingrained behavior that may override ethics or morality
(Milgram, 2009).
In a partial replication of Milgram’s experiment, Burger’s (2009) obedience rates
were only slightly lower than Milgram’s rates 45 years earlier. Several reasons have been
advanced for the high rates of obedience (Burger, 2009). First, Milgram’s experiments
suggested that ordinary people were willing to justify atrocities by claiming that they
were merely following orders, thus abdicating individual moral responsibility. Second,
the legitimacy of the authority figure is important, along with the cultural forces that
compel individuals to obey authority figures. Third, when the intensity of the demands is
gradually increased, attitudinal and behavioral changes are stronger. Milgram’s
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experiments also demonstrated the difficulty of translating intentions into actions when
someone is influenced by pressure (Blass, 1991).
After decades of broad psychological research, more recent studies have extended
the obedience concept to the business organization. For example, managers were more
likely to act unethically or illegally in the workplace when ordered to do so by a
supervisor than when acting under their own volition (Smith, Simpson, & Huang, 2007).
Many participants in recent high profile corporate frauds appeared to be ethical
employees who quietly went along with activities that were obviously unethical, and then
neutralized their negative feelings or regrets by denying responsibility for their behaviors
(Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004). Additionally, obedience pressure significantly
increased auditors’ willingness to sign off on an account balance that was materially
misstated (Lord & DeZoort, 2001).
In terms of the fraud triangle, CEO instigators, lacking opportunity or direct
access to the financial statements, may pressure CFOs to commit fraud. Obedience
pressure from the CEO authority figure may be viewed as a potential motivation for
CFOs under pressure from CEO instigators. At the same time, obedience theory provides
a potential rationalization for CFOs who act in conflict with their personal beliefs and
shift responsibility for their actions to the CEO authority figure. In an examination of
managers’ unethical behavior in 39 high-profile fraud cases, Cohen et al. (2010)
suggested that managers’ dominant influence or tyrannical/autocratic personalities
represent significant fraud-risk factors.
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Compliance Pressure
This study also investigates the influence of another social influence pressure,
compliance pressure, on CFO financial reporting behavior. Compliance pressure refers to
an individual’s acquiescence in response to an explicit or implicit request (Cialdini &
Trost, 1998) from either a peer or superior (DeZoort & Lord, 1997). Thus, the primary
distinction between the two types of social influence pressures lies in how the influence
attempt is framed – as a request (compliance) or a demand (obedience). In organizations,
compliance pressure includes both overt requests, as well as requests from unspoken
pressure inferred from organizational circumstances or the incentive structure (Prentice,
2007).
Target individuals may have various underlying reasons for accepting or adopting
the influence of others, including gaining rewards or approval and avoiding punishment
or disapproval. Frequently, individuals who acquiesce to compliance pressure publicly
agree while privately dissenting. Thus, compliance can occur even when the requested
behavior is incongruent with the target’s value system, and even when the target does not
believe in, accept, or internalize the content (Kelman, 1958; Nail, MacDonald, & Levy,
2000). For example, in situations involving initial disagreement between the source and
the target, Nail (1986) distinguishes between two types of conformity behavior:
conversion (publicly and privately agreeing with the source’s position) and compliance
(publicly agreeing but privately continuing to disagree).
Accountants who are asked to inappropriately change their actions face stressinducing compliance pressure. Pressure from a superior is particularly stressful for a
subordinate, particularly regarding the potential negative impact on job and career
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(DeZoort & Lord, 1994; DeZoort & Lord, 1997). For example, supervisor requests to
underreport time were found to have significant explanatory power regarding subordinate
auditors’ underreporting behavior (Lightner, Adams, & Lightner, 1982; Sweeney,
Arnold, & Pierce, 2010).
Followership Theory
Interviews with prosecutors and defense attorneys led Bucy et al. (2008) to
conclude that participants in fraudulent schemes are classified as either leaders or
followers, with different personality profiles and motives attributed to each group.
Additionally, followers can be separated into ineffective followers (whose actions clearly
have negative implications for their organization) and effective followers (independent,
critical thinkers whose creativity, innovation, and courage result in positive implications
for their organizations) (Kelley, 1992). The role of ineffective followers is important in
understanding financial statement fraud because collusion among top management team
(TMT) members is frequently a component of fraud schemes. Furthermore, Feng et al.’s
(2011) research supports the scenario of CEO instigators pressuring CFO followers. On
the other hand, practitioner literature offers examples of effective follower behavior,
noting that heroic followers effectively check the power of toxic leadership (Bennis,
2010) by thinking independently (Kelley, 1992) and acting courageously (Chaleff, 2003).
In an early attempt to classify followers, Zaleznik (1965) differentiated followers
based on their level of dominance vs. submissiveness and activity vs. passivity. The four
resulting groups were labeled impulsive, compulsive, masochistic, and withdrawn. Later,
Kelley (1988, 1992) identified five types of followers (effective, alienated, yes-people,
sheep, and survivors) according to their levels of critical independent thinking and
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activity level. In a related typology, Chaleff (2003) classified followers based on the level
of support given to the leader and the willingness to challenge the leader on critical
issues. The four resulting typologies are partner, implementer, individualist, and resource
followers. Chaleff highlights the importance of “the courageous follower” in strongly
supporting leaders, but challenging them if necessary. A review of the foregoing
typologies indicates that the activity level criterion is an important classification factor in
the practitioner literature, particularly in Zaleznik (1965) and Kelley (1988, 1992).
Kelley’s (1992) five types of followers are classified based on their degree of
independence and activity. Four of the five types of followers are deemed to be
ineffective or less than advantageous. The least effective, sheep, wander in herds waiting
for the leader’s instructions. Yes-people are also considered ineffective. Although they
are more active than sheep, they still depend on the leader and tell the leader what they
believe the leader wants to hear. Alienated followers are ineffective due to passivity.
They may think critically, but because they remain passive, they do not act on their
opinions. Pragmatic followers act based on political expediency or on the system’s
bureaucrats, and keep their ideas to themselves.
Kelley’s exemplary followers exercise independent critical thinking, evaluate
leadership’s requests, and balance their own ideas as well as those of the leader with the
organization’s goals and objectives. Kelley developed seven steps for acting as an
exemplary follower: (1) be proactive, (2) gather the facts, (3) seek wise counsel, (4) play
by the rules, (5) persuade by speaking the organization’s language, (6) have the courage
to go over heads when necessary, and (7) take collective action or be prepared to stand
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alone (Kelley, 1998). Kelley’s seven steps give common sense recommendations for
courageously offering dissenting opinions to a leader (Corrothers, 2009).
Chaleff’s (2003) four-quadrant model for followership mirrors Kelley’s model on
many points; however, it recognizes positive attributes in each category. For example, in
place of Kelley’s “sheep,” Chaleff’s “resource followers” work honestly, but not beyond
the minimum. Chaleff’s “partners” correspond with Kelley’s “exemplary” followers.
Partners support the leader vigorously, but are willing to question the leader’s behavior if
necessary.
Follower-Centered Approach
The discussion above provides a historical account of the underpinnings of
followership. This section describes how the focus of research on followers has
developed over time. Until recently, the leadership literature has primarily been leaderfocused, emphasizing the perspectives of the leader and largely ignoring the follower’s
perspectives (Kellerman, 2007). Beginning in the 1990s with Meindl’s (1995)
propositions, a follower-centered approach to leadership has explored how follower traits
influence the leadership process (Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009) and contribute to
a richer understanding of leadership (Sy, 2010). The growing interest in followership
recognizes that the complexity of organizational dynamics (a) demands an exploration of
the role of followers (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001), (b) examines follower-based
approaches to leadership (Shamir, 2007), and (c) considers the follower to be the primary
focus (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). The “romance of leadership” notion highlights the
potential bias toward the importance of leaders in organizations (Meindl, Ehrlich, &
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Dukerich, 1985) and urges an emphasis on followers and their interaction with leaders
(Meindl, 1995).
The Social Construction of Followership
After reviewing the evolution of the construct of followership from a historical
perspective, it is important to explore the interactions of followers with others in an
organizational setting. The roles of leaders and followers in an organization, by
definition, involve an imbalance of authority or a difference in status. Followers appear to
develop cognitive schemas over time regarding appropriate or inappropriate behavioral
norms or role behaviors to guide their actions in followership roles. Followership
behavior involves some degree of deference to the leader (Uhl-Bien & Pillai, 2007),
varying from passive to proactive followership (Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, &
McGregor, 2010). Thus, followers appear to have schemas of followership ranging from
subordination and obedience to partnership and co-leadership (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995;
Shamir, 2007). Individuals employ context-specific schemas depending on their position
in the organization and leadership contexts in the social construction process. Implicit
leadership theories (ILTs) and implicit followership theories (IFTs) represent dynamic
classifications of prototypical leadership and followership behavior that both leaders and
followers use as a basis for their organizational interaction with each other (Shondrick &
Lord, 2010). The identities of leaders and followers mutually impact each other, with
characters that shift within contexts (Collinson, 2006).
Core Self-Evaluations
For several decades researchers have investigated how executives’ demographic
and psychological characteristics are manifested in their behaviors, especially when they
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have a high degree of discretion (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The premise of this “upperechelons” research stream is that the personal demographic and psychological
characteristics of senior executives influence their choices in various organizational
settings. Previously, researchers have evaluated various measures of executive’s selfconcepts, including narcissism, hubris, and overconfidence. Recent psychological
research has focused on the more comprehensive concept of core self-evaluations (CSE)
to concisely measure an individual’s self-assessment. Hiller and Hamrick (2005)
proposed applying CSE to executive settings.
Judge, Locke, and Durham (1997) developed and validated CSE, a stable
personality trait that describes the “fundamental, bottom-line evaluations that individuals
hold about themselves, the world, and others” and subconsciously influences their
perceptions and behavior (Bono & Judge, 2003). CSE, a broad latent concept that
assesses an individual’s perceptions of self-worth, is composed of at least four specific
traits: self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and emotional stability (neuroticism). It
has been found to be a significant dispositional predictor of job satisfaction and job
performance (Judge & Bono, 2001). Research suggests that high CSE individuals work
more effectively in teams (Zhang & Peterson, 2011) and are more likely to achieve
economic success (Judge & Hurst, 2007). Additionally, CSE has been shown to have a
moderating effect on individual reactions to organizational social stressors (Harris,
Harvey, & Kacmar, 2009). Three of CSE’s four component traits have been investigated
at the executive level (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005).
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Hypotheses
This study investigates how CFOs’ followership propensity and core selfevaluations influence decision-making in conditions of CEO social influence pressure to
misstate financial statements. I predict that social influence pressure will increase CFOs’
propensity to revise an estimate and will lead CFOs to assign responsibility for their
actions to the CEO. I also expect the CFO’s level of followership to influence behavior,
such that the positive relationship between social influence pressure and CFO revision is
stronger when follower effectiveness is lower. Similarly, I expect CSEs to influence
CFOs’ behavior, such that the positive relationship between social influence pressure and
CFO revision is stronger when CSE is lower. Below, I formally develop these
expectations.
Several recent financial statement frauds involve pressure from CEOs on
subordinates to manipulate financial statements in conflict with GAAP in order to support
stock prices (Donegan & Ganon, 2008). For instance, Betty Vinson, a midlevel
accountant, reported enormous guilt and fear throughout the unrelenting pressure from
her bosses to make false accounting entries at WorldCom (Pulliam, 2003). Similarly,
Qwest’s CEO, Joseph Nacchio, exerted extreme pressure on subordinates to achieve
targets, paying bonuses if targets were met and threatening consequences if they were not
(SEC, 2005).
A common motivation in many recent high-profile frauds was management’s
desire to meet earnings forecasts (Beasley et al., 2010). For instance, the SEC alleged that
HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy instructed senior officers to match analysts’
expectations in order to maintain the stock’s market price, and to “fix it” by recording
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false earnings to make up any shortfall (SEC, 2003). Likewise, when Enron’s top
executives realized they were going to miss the number they had promised Wall Street,
they desperately scrambled to “fill the holes” in the company’s earnings (McLean &
Elkind, 2004). Clearly, top management pressure to meet earnings targets by adjusting
earnings has relevance in the accounting literature, as well as in actual fraud cases.
Considerable research investigates the influence of CEO equity incentives on firm
performance and accounting irregularities. For example, stock-option based
compensation is positively associated with CEO self-interested behavior, including the
likelihood of managing corporate earnings upward (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2005;
Burns & Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson, 2007), meeting or beating
earnings targets (Cheng & Warfield, 2005), and committing accounting fraud (Johnson,
Ryan, & Tian, 2009).
Despite the numerous examples of accountants succumbing to pressure from
CEOs, a review of accounting research uncovers only a small body of literature
concerning the susceptibility of accountants to social influence pressure. In a public
accounting firm setting, auditors were found to be susceptible to obedience pressure
when receiving inappropriate instructions from a superior (DeZoort & Lord, 1994; Lord
& DeZoort, 2001). Additionally, in experiments with management accountants, the
likelihood of violating explicit policy and creating budgetary slack increased when
subjects were faced with obedience pressure from an immediate superior (Davis,
DeZoort, & Kopp, 2006; Hartmann & Maas, 2010).
Compliance pressure from superiors influences auditors’ intention to engage in
dysfunctional behaviors. For example, supervisors’ requests to underreport time were
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found to have significant explanatory power regarding subordinate auditors’
underreporting behavior (Lightner, Adams, & Lightner, 1982; Sweeney, Arnold, &
Pierce, 2010).
Two studies examine the behavior of accountants under pressure leading to
financial statement manipulation. First, using student subjects, Baird and Zelin (2009)
found that pressure to obey supervisors overpowers an individual’s tendency to act
ethically, increasing an individual’s likelihood of participating in financial statement
fraud. Second, in a firm-level examination into causes of accounting manipulations, Feng
et al. (2011) provided indirect archival evidence on the effect of pressures from superiors
by suggesting that CFOs manipulate financial statements as a result of pressure from
CEOs rather than from an attempt to acquire immediate personal gain. I extend this
research, by examining specific types of pressure, using CFO subjects and the following
hypotheses, which draw on the limited accounting literature and the more extensive
social psychology literature:
H1a: CFOs under obedience pressure from the CEO to meet an earnings target
will report higher earnings (by recording a smaller final inventory
adjustment) than will CFOs under no obedience pressure.
H1b: CFOs under compliance pressure from the CEO to meet an earnings target
will report higher earnings (by recording a smaller final inventory
adjustment) than will CFOs under no compliance pressure.
Obedience theory, developed from Milgram’s series of studies, states that under
obedience pressure, target subordinates break from an autonomous state, become agents
for the authoritative source, and tend to deny responsibility (Milgram, 1963). The concept
of individuals shifting responsibility for their actions is a central tenet of obedience
theory (Burger, 2009). Milgram’s (1963) experiments suggested that ordinary people
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were willing to justify unethical behavior by claiming that they were merely following
orders, thus abdicating individual moral responsibility. Thus, obedience pressure links
two areas of the fraud triangle, pressure and rationalization. Additionally, obedience
pressure offers an explanation for a perplexing question in the arena of white-collar
crime: why seemingly “good” people, with moral convictions and a clean record, would
commit “bad” acts (Baird & Zelin, 2009). In accordance with obedience theory’s
responsibility shifting prediction, accountants who violated corporate policy found
themselves less responsible for their actions than did participants who refused to follow
inappropriate directives from the authority figure (Davis, DeZoort, & Kopp, 2006).
However, recent SOX 302 certification requirements were designed and implemented to
strengthen CFOs’ sense of responsibility for the financial statements. Such policy
enhancements introduce tension into the question of whether CFOs would be similarly
motivated to abdicate responsibility to their CEO and offer an opportunity to incorporate
such policy-related effects into the obedience theory literature. Thus, the current study
uses obedience theory to motivate the responsibility-shifting hypothesis in a scenario of
significant interest to policy makers.
I am not aware of any research investigating the degree to which individuals
under compliance pressure hold themselves less responsible for their actions. However,
in a setting in which the superior (as opposed to a peer) makes the request for
compliance, I expect the presence of an authority figure to result in a similar
responsibility shifting effect due to the power the supervisor holds over the subordinate.
Therefore, in accordance with obedience theory’s key component of responsibility
shifting, suggesting that individuals who succumb to obedience pressure will feel less
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responsible for their decision and will be more likely to assign responsibility for their
actions to their superior in comparison to individuals who resist pressure, I hypothesize
the following:
H2a: CFOs who revise their initial inventory judgments under obedience
pressure will find themselves less responsible for the decision than CFOs
who do not revise their inventory judgments under obedience pressure.
H2b: CFOs who revise their initial inventory judgments under compliance
pressure will find themselves less responsible for the decision than CFOs
who do not revise their inventory judgments under compliance pressure.
Social influence pressure literature posits that obedience pressure is the most
potent type of social influence pressure because of the power a hierarchical supervisor
holds over an employee. Pressure from a superior produces a great deal of stress in the
subordinate, particularly regarding the potential negative impact on job and career
(DeZoort & Lord, 1994, 1997). Obedience pressure is an order from a hierarchical
superior to a subordinate target. In contrast, compliance pressure is a request from a
colleague at any level. Thus, obedience pressure’s strength lies in a combination factors,
including the hierarchical nature of the relationship (superior to subordinate) and the way
the influence attempt is framed (order rather than request).
In another line of research exploring management’s power and influence in
organizations, Raven and his colleagues have developed, refined, and expanded a social
power taxonomy. French and Raven’s (1959; Raven, 1965) typology of the bases of
social power or tactics (e.g., legitimate, coercive, reward, referent, expert, and
informational) describes the types of power found in supervisor-subordinate
relationships. In their initial work (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965), social influence
was described as a target’s change in attitude, belief, or behavior that results from the
actions of an influencing agent. Individuals in positions of power can choose from a
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variety of power tactics when attempting to influence others (e.g., reward power promises
compensation in return for compliance, whereas coercive power threatens punishment in
order to gain compliance). Raven (1992) expanded the taxonomy to include 14 bases of
power and developed the power interaction model (see Elias, 2008 for a review) to
provide a theoretical framework for examining the antecedents and outcomes associated
with social power choice.
Subsequently, the soft-harsh classification (Koslowsky & Schwarzwald, 2001;
Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998) has been used to explore the use of power.
Harsh (or positional) tactics rely on the influencing agent’s status and are threatening in
that they are forceful and direct. In contrast, soft (or personal) tactics tend to be more
subtle and positive by relying on the influencing agent’s personal assets and using
collaboration or socializing. Thus, when classifying pressure types based on the
influencing strategy utilized, obedience pressure is a harsh tactic because it involves
hierarchy-based legitimate power (Raven et al., 1998) and compliance pressure is a soft
tactic.
The influencing agent’s choice of power tactics utilized to influence and gain
compliance is situationally contingent. For example, higher status individuals utilized a
greater variety of power tactics in conflict situations (Koslowsky & Schwarzwald, 1993),
harsh tactics usage was associated with environments where routine tasks predominated
(Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & Ochana-Levin, 2004), and harsh tactics met with greater
resistance from subordinates who perceived their supervisor as possessing similar
knowledge and experience (Koslowsky, Schwarzwald, & Ashuri, 2001). When choosing
power tactics to influence CFO targets, the foregoing discussion suggests that CEO
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influencing agents are likely to use a variety of tactics due to their higher status.
Additionally, given the more complicated nature of the situations, CEOs may avoid harsh
tactic usage. Finally, since CFOs are likely to perceive the CEO’s experience and
knowledge in financial matters as similar to their own or even less (less power distance),
if harsh tactics were used, CFO subordinates may react with resistance. As discussed in
the following pages, subordinates who resist inappropriate influences from superiors are
not only reflecting their disagreement, but may also be initiating a constructive dialog
toward a more positive outcome.
In conclusion, social influence pressure literature predicts that obedience pressure
is generally the most potent form of social influence pressure. In comparison, Raven’s
harsh-soft line of research suggests that compliance pressure may be more effective in the
CEO-CFO context due to the complex situation and the CEO’s lack of superiority in
financial reporting experience and knowledge in comparison to the CFO. Since the
preceding arguments suggest alternative effects, I do not make a directional prediction in
the following hypothesis:
H3:

The amount of earnings adjustment for CFOs under compliance pressure
will be different than that for CFOs under obedience pressure.

Followers and Leaders
White-collar criminals have been described as generally falling into two groups:
leaders or followers, with different personality profiles and motives (Bucy et al., 2008).
Top management team collusion in financial statement fraud schemes necessitates the
consideration of why certain followers are unwilling or unable to resist the pressures
exerted by their leaders.
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Historically, leadership studies have focused on the effects of exceptional leaders
on their followers (Bass, 1999; Conger & Kanungo, 1987; Shamir, House, & Arthur,
1993). Even though not all authority is just, we are taught from childhood to obey rather
than to challenge or question authority (Zimbardo, 2009). A dominant authority figure
who negatively influences subordinates increases the level of unethical behavior (Treviño
et al., 1998) and is a primary risk factor for fraud (AICPA, 2002). Recent studies
investigate “destructive leadership” and the toxic triangle: destructive leaders, susceptible
followers, and conducive environments (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; Thoroughgood,
Hunter, & Sawyer, 2011).
Followers’ self-worth may become intertwined with the leader’s vision, and
unethical charismatic leaders with unilateral power may select or mold obedient or
dependent followers (Howell & Avolio, 1992). Charismatic leaders are frequently able to
inspire trust and a “reflexive obedience” in subordinate followers (Zahra, Priem, &
Rasheed, 2005). Researchers have divided followers into groups of conformers, who
passively comply whether through fear or reverence, and colluders, who actively
participate through greed or ego (Padilla et al., 2007). Accountants should create
environments conducive to good followership (Arlinghaus, 2006).
Kelley’s (1992) model of follower behavior suggests that followers from the
world of accounting “who are conformist (active and dependent, uncritical thinking) and
passive (passive and dependent, uncritical thinking) would be most prone to be
influenced by the policies, actions and language of their CEO” (Amernic & Craig, 2010).
Similarly, in an exploratory qualitative study, Carsten et al. (2010) found that some
followers are passive, obedient, and deferent, while others view their roles as
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participative and proactive. Sy (2010) surveyed leaders’ perceptions of follower
characteristics and developed a followership prototype (industry, enthusiasm, and good
citizen) and followership antiprototype (conformity, insubordination, and incompetence).
Sy urged an extension of his research to an examination of followers’ perceptions.
Chaleff (2003) urges followers to appropriately exercise resistance or
“courageous followership” by challenging the leader or voicing constructive criticism and
dissent. He indicates that courageous followers have the courage to assume
responsibility, to serve, to challenge, to participate in the transformation, and to take
moral action. Thus, Chaleff also values active participation among followers and asserts
that some followers with high activity levels are be more likely to voice dissent against
inappropriate leader behavior.
Typologies provide a parsimonious framework for describing complex processes
and consistent patterns among constructs “that should be subjected to quantitative
modeling and rigorous empirical testing” (Doty & Glick, 1994). Typologies have been
used to explain charismatic (Trice & Beyer, 1993) and transformational (Tichy &
Devanna, 1986) leadership.
Of the primary practitioner typologies described above, only Kelley (1992)
provides a published instrument by which followers can be assessed and categorized.
Kelley’s scale provides a grounded means of analysis for follower effectiveness
(according to levels of critical independent thinking and activity level), and coupled with
Kelley’s typology provides a means to predict variance among constructs (Doty & Glick,
1994). I initiate the investigation of followership among accountants with the following
hypothesis:
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H4:

Followership will moderate the relationship between social influence
pressure and CFO financial statement revision, such that the positive
relationship between social influence pressure and CFO financial
statement revision is stronger when follower effectiveness is lower.

Core Self-Evaluations
Effective transformational leaders engage and mobilize followers by articulating a
vision and incorporating followers into the vision. Shamir, House, and Arthur (1993)
suggest that successful charismatic leaders match their vision with followers’ existing
goals and individual self-concepts. Thus, certain follower personality or behavioral
characteristics may moderate the effect of leadership on outcomes. For instance, in a
meta-analysis of 136 behavioral ethics studies, Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño
(2010) investigated the antecedents of unethical decision making in organizations,
including individual characteristics. Their results indicated that individuals who obey the
authority figures are lower in cognitive moral development, are Machiavellian, and have
an external locus of control.
The core self-evaluations (CSE) (Judge et al., 2003) construct is designed to
measure the appraisals people make of their overall value; their capabilities in controlling
their life; their competence in performing, coping, and succeeding; and their general
belief that their life will turn out well. CSE is a relatively new construct indicated by the
following traits: self-esteem, self-efficacy, locus of control, and neuroticism (i.e.,
emotional stability).
CSE’s four component traits are among the most frequently studied in the
psychology literature. For example, Hinrichs (2007) proposed that low self-efficacy
followers (who believe they lack leadership capability or potential) are more likely to
defer moral responsibility to the leader and to view leaders as having more responsibility
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in decision-making. Additionally, prior research suggests follower self-esteem is related
to both organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and deviant workplace behavior
(DWB) (Avey, Palanski, & Walumbwa, 2011).
In a setting in which a hierarchical superior exerts social influence pressure, I
expect a target individual’s level of resistance to be influenced by their self-esteem, selfefficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability. Specifically, individuals high in CSE
feel confident, competent, and successful. Additionally, they feel capable of coping with
problems, in control of their own success, and able to determine their own destiny. This
discussion suggests the following hypothesis:
H5:

CSE will moderate the relationship between social influence pressure and
CFO revision, such that the positive relationship between social influence
pressure and CFO financial statement revision is stronger when CSE is
lower.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
Experimental Task
To evaluate pressure’s effect on financial reporting decisions, the participants
completed an experimental task (provided in the Appendix) involving social influence
pressure from the CEO to engage in earnings manipulation. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the three pressure treatment groups: a control group receiving no
pressure, an obedience pressure group (i.e., demand from a superior), and a compliance
pressure group (i.e., request from a superior).
After completing the experimental task, the participants in each treatment group
completed a brief followership questionnaire and a CSE instrument to assess whether
their individual personality characteristics influenced their level of intention to revision
their estimate (these are not included in the Appendix). Finally, participants completed a
series of questions that will be used as a manipulation check and to collect demographic
information about the participants.
Design
The study’s three-level design involved an experiment with three types of social
influence pressure manipulated randomly between subjects: a control group receiving no
pressure, an obedience pressure group (i.e., demand from a superior), and a compliance
pressure group (i.e., request from a superior). Participants in each of the three pressure
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treatment groups were evaluated based upon their scores on Kelley’s (1992) 20-item
followership questionnaire and the 12-item Judge et al. (2003) Core Self-Evaluations
Scale (CSE).
Research Instrument
The instrument provided the participants with a financial reporting case involving
a CFO’s earnings manipulation decision under three types of CEO pressure. The case
materials and vignette are partially derived from previous research (DeZoort, Hermanson,
& Houston, 2003a, 2003b; Libby & Kinney, 2000). The vignette described a “gray” or
ambiguous earnings management scenario, and involved a CFO’s decision regarding
whether to meet an earnings target by manipulating the amount of an inventory
adjustment.
Participants assumed the role of CPAs employed as CFOs for a mid-size publicly
traded company that manufactures and distributes cellular telephone accessories to
retailers. First, participants were presented with the financial information, including
estimated year-end balances for the current year, pretax earnings per share (EPS) as
currently stated of $1.10 per share, and the consensus analysts’ EPS forecast of $1.08 per
share. Next, the participants were presented with an inventory obsolescence issue for
their consideration. A competitor’s newly introduced product is expected to reduce
demand and services for one of their products, necessitating an inventory write-down to
net realizable value. Participants were told that their tentatively proposed adjustment
would reduce pretax EPS from $1.10 to $1.06. Ultimately, the participants were given the
opportunity to revise their inventory adjustment.
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Independent Measures
Social influence pressure (PRESSURE) was manipulated at three types based on
statements made by the CFO’s immediate supervisor, the company’s CEO, during a
meeting to discuss the year-end financial results. Participants in the control group (no
pressure condition) were assured “that ultimately the inventory write-down decision is
yours to make”. In the obedience pressure condition, the CFO received pressure to
engage in earnings management from the CEO who emphasized the extreme importance
of meeting short-term earnings estimates – and explicitly tells the CFO to change the
tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings target. In the compliance
pressure condition, the CFO again received pressure from the CEO, but rather than a
directive, the pressure is in the form of a request – the CEO asks the CFO to change the
tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings target.
Dependent Measures
Revision of an Inventory Adjustment Decision
The vignette involved professional judgment regarding a CFO’s decision in
response to CEO pressure to change an accounting estimate (i.e., to revise their initial
inventory adjustment recommendation to meet an earnings target). After reading the
background information regarding a financial reporting decision, the participants’
propensity to revise was assessed using a three-item measure. First, participants were
asked to indicate “the likely final inventory adjustment and pretax EPS you would
record” with endpoints of “$1.06, your initial adjustment” and “$1.10, EPS before any
adjustment” (REVISION). The decision to revise enough to meet an earnings target
(move from $1.06 to the analysts’ forecast of $1.08 of EPS) is less than 2% of pretax
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EPS, but it is qualitatively material according to Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99,
Materiality (SEC, 1999) since it means the difference between meeting or missing an
earnings target.
Next, participants were asked about actions of a typical or average CFO in an
attempt to obtain more unbiased responses to questions regarding sensitive subjects such
as potential accounting fraud (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1996). In addition to asking the
participants to indicate the “final inventory adjustment and pretax EPS you would
record”, I also asked subjects to indicate the “final inventory adjustment and pretax EPS
that a typical public company CFO would record in this situation”. This additional
question was intended to control for the potential “social desirability” or “halo” effect in
business ethics cases measuring behavioral intention (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993) and to
eliminate potential bias induced by vanity (Milgram, 2009). Additionally, I avoided
value-laden language in the case and questions by asking participants for an honest
assessment of an adjustment, without labeling the adjustment as fraudulent, aggressive, or
manipulative. I also included language in the case indicating that the adjustment involved
considerable judgment and subjectivity.
Participants were asked to briefly explain their decision with the following openended questions: Please list at least two primary reasons in order of importance for your
decision (and a typical public company CFO’s decision) in this situation. Participants’
responses provided a richer understanding and additional insight into the potential
rationalizations and responsibility shifting associated with participants’ judgments.
Finally, the participants were asked to estimate the percentage of typical CFOs who
would “make a small enough final inventory adjustment to result in pretax EPS of $1.08
or more”.
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Responsibility Assessment
Participants were asked to “assign responsibility for your final inventory
adjustment” using a 100-point allocation method between themselves (the CFO), their
superior (the CEO), and others. This assessment indicated the degree to which
participants accept responsibility themselves or assign responsibility for their decision to
the authority figure. Participants were also asked the following open-ended question:
“Please indicate the reasons for your decision above regarding allocating responsibility
for the final inventory adjustment among the CFO (you), the CEO (Chris), or others”.
Other Measures
Manipulation Check
To determine whether the participants interpreted the study’s experimental
manipulation in the intended way, the instrument included a multiple-choice question
regarding the CEO’s communication regarding the final inventory adjustment.
Specifically, participants were asked whether the CEO said that the inventory write-down
decision was “yours to make” (no pressure), “asked you to please change your proposed
inventory write-down” (compliance pressure) or “told you to change your proposed
inventory write-down” (obedience pressure). (See discussion in the Results section
regarding the wording of this question and its revision in the second mailing.)
Perceptions of the Case
Participants were asked a series of questions to assess the understandability and
realism of the case. To obtain the participants’ perceptions of the degree of ethical
conflict in the case and the ethicality of the proposed action, participants were asked, “If
the situation described in this case were real, how much pressure would you feel to record
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a smaller final inventory adjustment (smaller than the $2 million tentative adjustment)?”;
and “In this case, do you believe it is unethical for the CFO to record a smaller final
inventory adjustment (smaller than the $2 million tentative adjustment)?”. To assess
participants’ views regarding the legality of the case scenario, participants were asked,
“In this case, do you believe it is illegal for the CFO to record a smaller final inventory
adjustment (smaller than the $2 million initial adjustment)?”. In addition, participants
were asked to indicate whether they have ever actually been pressured by anyone to
improperly manipulate the financial statements.
Whistleblowing
To assess the likelihood of whistleblowing in the experimental situation,
following Davis et al. (2006), the obedience [compliance] treatment groups were asked,
“If you were faced with this situation in practice, how likely would you be to report the
CEO’s order [request] telling [asking] you to ‘go back and fix this now so that we meet
our target’”? Additionally, participants were asked to indicate the party to whom they
would most likely report.
Demographic and Company Variables
Demographic control variables included age, gender, education, job title,
professional experience, and professional certification. Company characteristics included
the company’s industry and size in revenue.
Moderator Variables
Followership
Based on the followership questionnaire, participants were evaluated as to their
level of followership (FOLLOWERSHIP) based on Kelley’s (1992) 20-question
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followership questionnaire which includes two dimensions: activity level (10 items) and
propensity for independent thinking (10 items). Kelley’s instrument utilizes a seven-point
Likert scale, ranging from 1-Rarely, 4-Occasionally, to 7-Almost Always (Kelley uses a
0-6 scale, while I coded the scale from 1 to 7). Similarly, the current study measures the
CFOs’ self-reported frequencies utilizing a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1Rarely, 4-Occasionally, to 7-Almost Always. Kelly’s effective followers score high on
both activity level and independent thinking. Thus, follower effectiveness increases as
both activity level (10 to 70 in the current study) and independent thinking (10 to 70 in
the current study) increase, ultimately creating a continuous variable measuring
followership (20 to 140 in the current study).
This instrument included 10 questions to assess activity level and 10 questions to
assess level of independent thinking. Example items are, “Do you take the initiative to
seek out and successfully complete assignments that go above and beyond your job?”;
“Do you independently think up and champion new ideas that will contribute
significantly to the leader’s or the organization’s goals?”; and “Do you assert your views
on important issues even though it might mean conflict with your group or reprisals from
the leader?”
Core Self-Evaluations
Core Self-Evaluations (CSE) were assessed with the 12-item Judge et al. (2003)
core self-evaluations instrument. The instrument measured participants’ responses
utilizing a five-point Likert scale with endpoints of 1-Strongly disagree and 5-Strongly
agree. Example items are, “When I try, I generally succeed.”; “Overall, I am satisfied
with myself.”; and “I am capable of coping with most of my problems.” Based on the
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results of the instrument, participants were evaluated as to their level of CSE. This
instrument has six reverse-coded items. CSE increases as scores increase, producing a
continuous variable ranging from 12 to 60 (Tsaousis, Nikolaou, Serdaris, & Judge, 2007).
A recent review of 15 years of CSE research found general support for CSE’s internal
consistency, reliability and validity (Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012).
The items for the 20-question followership questionnaire and 12-item core selfevaluations scale were included in the instrument. Cronbach’s alpha is used to explore the
internal consistency of the scales as applied to the CFO sample. The Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients of .835 for the followership scale and .828 for the CSE scale are well above
the recommended level of .70 (Hair et al., 2010).
Because the study’s data are collected using a self-report measure in a single
instrument, the possibility of common methods bias must be addressed (Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). The research instrument was carefully designed in
an attempt to minimize the potential sources of common method variance. Additionally,
Harman’s single-factor test is used to diagnose the extent of any potential threats to
internal validity. The results of Harman’s single-factor test do not indicate a problem
resulting from common methods bias. An exploratory factor analysis with the study’s
variables reveals that no single factor accounts for more than 29% of the variance (well
under the 50% level for concern).
Model
Based on the discussion above, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model is
used to examine the effects of pressure on the inventory adjustment decision and test
hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5. The complete model is:
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REVISION = f (PRESSURE, FOLLOWERSHIP, CSE, PRESSURE X
FOLLOWERSHIP, PRESSURE X CSE, ACCTEXP)
PRESSURE has three levels (1 = no pressure, 2 = compliance pressure, and 3 =
obedience pressure). FOLLOWERSHIP and CSE are measured as continuous variables
from 20 to 140 and 12 to 60, respectively. ACCTEXP (the natural log of each CFO’s
accounting experience) is a control variable.
Pretesting
The primary focus of the case materials was to evaluate professionals’ propensity
to revise their accounting estimate and their susceptibility to pressure. Given the sensitive
nature of the research focus and the fact that respondents were drawn from the top
management team, particular care was taken with the design and administration of the
research instrument. The materials were developed with reference to previously
published research (DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b; Libby and Kinney, 2000) and reviewed
by a panel of experts active in the accounting behavioral ethics area for realism,
relevance, accuracy, and internal consistency. Additionally, the questionnaire was pilot
tested with a small group of graduate accounting students and with a few individuals with
previous CFO experience. The instrument was revised based on this feedback.
Participants
A total of one hundred twenty one (121) U.S. public company CFOs participated
in the study. Participants were drawn from an Audit Analytics pool of public company
CFOs appointed or reappointed between 1/1/2005 to 6/30/2012 to serve companies with
revenues greater than $0 but less than $2 billion. After eliminating 196 addresses in nonEnglish speaking countries, the CFO sample was randomly selected from the Audit
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Analytics pool of the 2,238 most recently appointed CFOs in companies matching the
revenue and date criteria. The case materials were mailed via USPS priority mail to 635
CFOs. Each packet included a personalized letter on the university’s color letterhead, a
hand-stamped return envelope, a hand-written note encouraging participation, and the
incentive of a charitable contribution to the charity of their choice (Dillman, 2009).
Sixteen packages were returned due to insufficient addresses and resent after obtaining
better addresses. Second requests were sent four weeks after the initial mailing. A total of
121 CFOs responded, for a response rate of 20% based on the adjusted sample size of
607 (there were 28 sets of undeliverable materials).
The 20% response rate is quite good when compared to other recent CFO studies,
particularly unsponsored studies (studies without a sponsoring professional organization).
For example, a study mailed to public company CFOs drawn from the Compact
Disclosure database yielded a 7% response rate (Gillett & Uddin, 2005). The 15.1%
response rate from CFOs in Gibbins, McCracken, & Salterio (2007) was described as the
highest response rate to date for a Financial Executives Institute (FEI)-sponsored study.
In a recent email study co-sponsored by CFO Magazine and Duke University, 5.4% of
the CFOs responded (Dichev, Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2012). Audit committee
studies sponsored by large accounting firms (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b, 2008)
have typically drawn response rates of approximately 20%, but similar studies without
sponsors (e.g., Bierstaker et al. 2012) have response rates of 10% or less.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Manipulation Check and Related Issues
A manipulation check question was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
manipulation in the case instrument. In the first mailing, participants were asked to,
“Indicate your judgment as to the degree of pressure on the CFO to make a smaller final
inventory adjustment to meet the earnings target”. The response choices were (1) The
CEO, Chris, said that ultimately the inventory write-down decision is yours to make, (2)
The CEO, Chris, asked you to please change your proposed inventory write-down, and
(3) The CEO, Chris, told you to change your proposed inventory write-down.
This question was reworded for the second mailing after written comments from
three respondents indicated confusion over the wording, and based on a lower than
expected pass rate for the initial mailing (49%). In the second mailing, participants were
asked, “Which of the following reflects the CEO’s communication to you regarding the
final inventory adjustment?” The response choices remained the same in the second
mailing. The participants’ pass rate improved to 78.3% on the second mailing, for an
overall manipulation check pass rate of 54.5%.1 After eliminating 55 CFOs who failed
the manipulation check, 66 participants remained for subsequent hypothesis testing.
1

The overall manipulation check results are reasonably comparable with prior studies with executive-level
subjects. For example, in studies of audit committee members, DeZoort et al. (2003a) and DeZoort et al.
(2003b) report manipulation check failure rates of 38% and 36%, respectively, versus 45.5% in the present
study.
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The ANCOVA results for the full sample (n = 117 after excluding those with
incomplete responses) are not consistent with the results presented in Table 5. For
example, if participants who failed the manipulation check are included, Model 2 in
Table 5 is not significant (p = 0.52)2. Thus, the study’s findings hold only when CFOs
who fail the manipulation check are excluded.
The only significant demographic or expertise difference between respondents
failing the manipulation check question and respondents passing the manipulation check
question was age. Respondents who failed the manipulation check were significantly (p <
0.01) older (M = 53.11; SD = 7.39) than those who passed (M = 49.24; SD = 6.46).
The power of the manipulation (for those passing the manipulation check
question) also was evaluated with an alternative measure designed to assess the
participants’ perception of pressure in the case. Specifically, participants were asked, “If
the situation described in this case were real, how much pressure would you feel to record
a smaller final inventory adjustment (smaller than the $2 million initial adjustment)?” on
a 100-point3 scale with endpoints4 of 0 = “None” and 100 = “A Great Deal”.
As presented in Table 1, obedience group participants perceived significantly
more pressure (M = 64.48, SD = 25.75) than members of the control group (M = 39.39,

2

All p-values are two-tailed, unless otherwise indicated.

3

Such 100-point scales are common in similar studies in accounting literature (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2003a,
2003b, 2008; Bierstaker et al., 2012).
4

For the instrument’s 100-point graphic rating scales, participants were asked to indicate their responses
by placing a slash on a ruled line with labeled anchors. Their slash-mark responses were then converted to
the 0-100 scale based on where the slash crossed the line (DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2008; Bierstaker et
al., 2012). However, some respondents indicated their answers with a circle. The circled responses were
converted to a 0-100 scale based on the center of the circle on the line or based on the value corresponding
to the circled anchor values if the words were circled.
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SD = 29.06) and the compliance group (M = 45.00, SD = 30.58) (p = 0.004 and p = 0.030,
respectively). In contrast, the difference in the perceived pressure of the compliance
group and the control group was not significant. Thus, the choice of power tactics
employed by the CEO affected the perception of pressure in participant CFOs. This
points to the effectiveness of the experimental setting.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics: Perceived pressure (n = 66 CFOs)
Overall

n

Mean

SD

t

Sig.

No pressure (control)
Compliance pressure
Obedience pressure
Total

23
22
21
66

39.39
45.00
64.48
49.24

29.06
30.58
25.75
30.12

-.631a
-3.019 a

.532
.004

a
b

t

Sig.

-2.253 b

.030

Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of no pressure group.
Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of compliance pressure group.

All p-values are two-tailed.
Pressure Treatment Groups:
No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO.
Compliance pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a request – the
CEO asks the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings
target.
Obedience pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a demand – the CEO
tells the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings target.

Participants’ Perceptions of the Case
Overall, the participants found the case to be realistic and understandable. Using a
100-point scale (anchored 0 = “Not at all Realistic” and 100 = “Very Realistic”), the
participants agreed that the case was realistic (M = 64.64, SD = 26.22). The participants
also indicated that the case was understandable (M = 88.20, SD = 14.54) on a scale
anchored 0 = “Not at all Understandable” and 100 = “Very Understandable”). Both
means are significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001).
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Participants’ views as to the ethicality and legality of the experimental setting
showed more variation (perhaps due to the purposeful selection of a “gray” fact
situation). The participants had diverse views about whether changing their inventory
adjustment would be unethical. When asked, “In this case, do you believe it is unethical
for the CFO to record a smaller final inventory adjustment?”, the mean response of 46.71
(SD = 32.02) was not significantly different than the midpoint of 50 on a scale anchored 0
= “Completely Unethical” and 100 = “Completely Ethical”. However, 20 respondents’
responses were < 25 and 17 respondents’ responses were > 75. The CFO participants
indicated that recording the inventory adjustment would not be illegal when asked, “In
this case, do you believe it is illegal for the CFO to record a smaller final inventory
adjustment?” The participants’ mean response of 63.92 (SD = 33.14) on a 100-point scale
anchored 0 = “Completely Illegal” and 100 = “Completely Legal” was significantly
greater than the scale midpoint of 50 (p = 0.001).
There were no significant differences in responses to the ethicality and legality
questions between pressure groups (p > 0.050 in all cases). However, the 40 CFOs who
did not change their initial adjustment felt such a change was significantly (p = 0.001)
more unethical (M = 36.85; SD = 27.67) than the 26 CFOs who ultimately changed their
recommended adjustment in the case (M = 61.88; SD = 32.81). Participants showed
similar differences in their judgment as to the legality of the situation. The CFOs who did
not change their recommended adjustment in the case viewed the prospect of making
such a change to be significantly (p = 0.02) more illegal (M = 56.33; SD = 31.96) than the
CFOs who did not change their recommendation (M = 75.62; SD = 32.07).
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Participants were also asked if they had “ever actually been pressured by anyone
to improperly manipulate the financial statements”. Sixteen (24.2%) of the CFOs
reported experiencing improper pressure. The CEO was identified as the source of the
pressure in 62.5% of such cases. The prevalence of actual improper pressure from CEOs
reinforces anecdotal evidence from high-profile fraud cases and confirms the importance
of the topic.
Participants subjected to pressure in the hypothetical case expressed mixed
feelings toward whistleblowing. When asked about the likelihood that that they would
report an improper request (or order) to “go back and fix this now so that we meet our
target” (on a 100-point scale anchored 0 = “Very Unlikely” and 100 = “Very Likely”) the
mean response of 45.47 (SD = 34.14) was not significantly different than the indifference
midpoint of 50. Participants’ responses reflected strong feelings at both extremes. Almost
half (41.8%) of the responses were less than 25, and nearly one-third of the responses
were greater than 75 (30.2%). There were no significant differences in responses between
pressure groups or between participants who revised their recommended adjustment and
those who did not.
Respondent Demographics
Table 2 presents demographic information for the 66 CFOs (participants are
collectively referred to as CFOs, although one participant is identified as a controller). A
majority of the participants were CPAs (81.8%) with public accounting experience
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(84.8%). Most of the participant CFOs (89.4%) were male and between the ages of 40
and 59 (86.3%). Thirty-nine percent of the participants have a graduate degree.
Participants possessed a mean of 5.7 years of experience in their current position and 20.6
years of accounting experience. In a majority of the cases, the CFO’s current company
operated in a non-regulated industry (74.2%) and reported total revenue less than $250
million (59.1%). In summary, the participants’ demographics indicate that they possess
the ability and expertise required to complete the research materials and render a
judgment in a complex accounting situation.
Additionally, when compared to the 5,055 CFOs in the subset of the Audit
Analytics database from which they were drawn, the respondents were similar in age and
size of company of employment (see Table 2), suggesting that the sample is
representative of the Audit Analytics population of CFOs on certain dimensions.
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TABLE 2. Participant demographics (n = 66 CFOs)
Variable

Number

Percent

65
1

98.5%
1.5%

5
28
29
4

7.6%
42.4%
43.9%
6.1%

59
7

89.4%
10.6%

40
24
1
1
54
56

60.6%
36.4%
1.5%
1.5%
81.8%
84.8%

39
10
10
7

59.1%
15.2%
15.2%
10.6%

49
15
2

74.2%
22.7%
3.0%

Mean

SD

5.7
20.6

4.2
10.2

Title
CFO
Controller
CFO age a
Under 40
40-49
50-59
60 or over
CFO gender
Male
Female
CFO education
Bachelors
Masters
JD
PhD/DBA
CFOs with CPA certification
CFOs with public accounting experience
Annual revenue of CFO’s current company a
Under $250 million
$250 – $499 million
$500 – $999 million
$1 billion and over
Industry of current company b
Non-regulated industry
Regulated industry
No response
Years of experience
Current position
Accounting
a
b

Means for CFOs in the subset of the Audit Analytics database are as follows: CFO age (46.9) and annual
company revenue ($339 million).
Participants were dispersed across 20 industry categories with no more than 9 CFOs in any category.
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Descriptive Results for REVISION
The descriptive results for the dependent variable, REVISION, by pressure
treatment are presented in Table 3. The results in Panel A present the CFO’s propensity
to revise an estimate in response to CEO pressure to meet an earnings target (i.e., to
revise the initial inventory adjustment recommendation to meet an earnings target).
Specifically, the mean results reflect the degree to which CFOs are willing to change
their initial estimate on a scale of 0 (the CFO’s initial adjustment of $2 million or $1.06
EPS; i.e., no change to the CFO’s initial estimate) to 100 (an adjustment of $0 or $1.10
EPS; i.e., CFO changes his/her estimate to $0). Thus, higher values of REVISION
indicate greater acquiescence to the CEO’s pressure in the pressure conditions (and
greater reductions of the CFO’s initial inventory adjustment). The midpoint of 50
represents the CEO’s desired adjustment (an adjustment of $1 million or $1.08 EPS; i.e.,
a change to meet the analysts’ forecast). Panel B presents the results measured by the
actual dollar amount of the CFO’s inventory adjustment revision (i.e., a scale of $0 of
revision to $2,000,000 of revision). Subsequent results are presented using the 0 to 100
scale only.

	
  

48
Table 3. Descriptive statistics: Pressure effects on inventory adjustment revisions
(REVISION) (n = 66 CFOs)
Pressure treatment group

n

Mean
(0-100)

SD
(0-100)

t

Sig.

t

Sig.

Panel A: Means using 0-100 scale
(0 = $2 million final adjustment [no revision], 100 = $0 final adjustment [complete revision])
No pressure (control)
Compliance pressure
Obedience pressure
Total

Pressure treatment group

23
22
21
66

n

4.91
21.05
18.67
14.67

14.39
31.89
27.35
26.10

Mean
($)

SD
($)

-2.171a
-2.059 a

.038
.048

.262 b

.795

Final adjustment
% Participants assigning
$2M
$2M<x<$1M
<$1M

Panel B: Means using $ size of downward revision
No pressure (control)
Compliance pressure
Obedience pressure
Total
a
b

23
22
21
66

$98,200
$421,000
$373,400
$293,400

$287,800
$637,800
$547,000
$522,000

83%
50%
48%
61%

9%
23%
33%
21%

9%
27%
19%
18%

Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of no pressure group.
Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of compliance pressure group.

All p-values are two-tailed.
Pressure Treatment Groups:
No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO.
Compliance pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a request – the
CEO asks the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings
target.
Obedience pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a demand – the CEO
tells the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings target.

The pressure-related hypotheses predicted that CFOs under social influence
pressure from the CEO would be more likely to make revisions to their estimates than
CFOs under no pressure. Specifically, Hypotheses 1a and 1b predicted that obedience
pressure and compliance pressure would influence CFOs’ inventory adjustments (i.e.,
CFOs would report higher earnings by recording a smaller final inventory adjustment).
Consistent with H1a and H1b, the results in Table 3 show that CFOs’ mean inventory
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revisions for the compliance and obedience pressure groups (M = 21.05 and 18.67,
respectively) are significantly higher than the mean inventory revision of 4.91 (p < 0.038
and p < 0.048, respectively) for the control group under no such pressure.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that CFO judgments under compliance pressure would be
different than CFO judgments under obedience pressure, with no prediction as to the
direction of the difference. However, there was not a significant difference in CFO
response under compliance versus obedience pressure (p = 0.795), inconsistent with
hypothesis 3. Thus, the revisions of CFOs subjected to compliance pressure were similar
to the revisions of CFOs under obedience pressure. This result is interesting when
considered in light of the participants’ reported levels of perceived pressure (see Table 1
above). CFOs under compliance pressure indicated low levels of perceived pressure,
similar to the control group and significantly less than the obedience group. Taken
together, the perceived pressure and revision results suggest that although compliance
pressure does not create perceived pressure, it generates an actual response (REVISION)
similar to obedience pressure.
Responses by pressure treatment group (Panel B) reveal significant differences in
the proportion of participants willing to revise their initial adjustment so as to meet the
analysts’ forecast (make an inventory adjustment of $1 million or less). Only two
participants (9%) in the control group made such an adjustment. In contrast, six (27%) of
the compliance group participants and four (19%) of the obedience pressure group
participants made inventory adjustment recommendations sufficient to meet the earnings
target.
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Table 4 provides descriptive results for the moderator and control variables (i.e.,
followership, CSE, and accounting experience). The results are categorized according to
the degree to which CFOs ultimately revised their inventory adjustment in response to
CEO pressure (i.e., no pressure, no acquiescence, zone of compromise, and total
acquiescence). The means appear quite similar across groups, and t-tests reveal no
significant differences (p > 0.05). These relations are further explored in the ANCOVA
testing below.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics: Moderator and control variables (n = 66 CFOs)
Pressure response group

FOLLOWERSHIP
CSF

CSE

ACCTEXP

Mean
SD
n

115.41
11.09
23

3.99
.47
23

21.00
10.24
23

Pressure, but no acquiescence
($2M)

Mean
SD
n

119.43
8.88
21

3.95
.53
21

21.81
9.36
21

Pressure and Zone of Compromise
($2M<x<$1M)

Mean
SD
n

120.50
7.38
12

4.06
.51
12

23.08
8.73
12

Pressure and total acquiescence
(<$1M)

Mean
SD
n

115.10
11.23
10

3.88
.55
10

14.40
12.17
10

No pressure (control)

Pressure Response Groups:
No pressure (control) group: participants were not subjected to pressure treatment.
No acquiescence group: participants refused to change their initial inventory adjustment
recommendation of $2 million despite a demand or request by the CEO.
Zone of compromise group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of
$2 million, but not to $1 million as demanded or requested by the CEO.
Total acquiescence group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of
$2 million to $1 million or less in response to a demand or request by the CEO.
Variable Definitions:
FOLLOWERSHIP = total score on the 20-item Followership questionnaire, with each item measured
on 7-point scale (possible total score range 20 - 140);
CSE = total score on the 12-item Core Self Evaluations scale, with each item
measured on a 5-point scale (possible total score range 12 - 60); and
ACCTEXP = years of accounting experience (raw years of experience are shown in this
table).
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ANCOVA Results
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model is used to examine the effects of
pressure on the inventory adjustment decision and test hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5 (see
subsequent section for testing of H2). The complete model is shown below:
REVISION = f (PRESSURE, FOLLOWERSHIP, CSE, PRESSURE X
FOLLOWERSHIP, PRESSURE X CSE, ACCTEXP)
PRESSURE has three levels (1 = no pressure, 2 = compliance pressure, and 3 =
obedience pressure).5 FOLLOWERSHIP and CSE are measured as continuous variables
from 20 to 140 and 12 to 60, respectively. ACCTEXP (the natural log of each CFO’s
accounting experience) is a control variable.6 Previous research indicates that a CFO’s
number of years of experience is positively associated with earnings quality (Aier et al.,
2005). Additional potential control variables were added to the model, one at a time –
age, gender, education, professional certification, years in current position, years of
public accounting experience, annual revenue of current company, and industry
(regulated or not). None of these was significantly related to REVISION (p > 0.05).
The ANCOVA results for H1, H3, H4 and H5 are presented in Table 5. Model 1
includes only the manipulated variable (PRESSURE), Model 2 adds the moderator
variables (FOLLOWERSHIP and CSE) and control variable (ACCTEXP), and Model 3
adds the interactions (PRESSURE X FOLLOWERSHIP and PRESSURE X CSE) to

5

When PRESSURE is converted to a dummy variable (0 = no pressure, 1 = pressure), Model 2 results in
Table 5 are similar and PRESSURE is significant at p < 0.01.
6

Substituting raw accounting experience for the natural log of each CFO’s accounting experience in Model
2 in Table 5 produces similar results (ACCTEXP has p = 0.001).
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allow for testing of H4 and H5. Results from Model 1 provide some support for the
influence of PRESSURE on REVISION (F = 2.64; p = 0.080).
Model 2 is significant (F = 3.34; p = 0.010), and adjusted R2 improves from 4.8%
in Model 1 to 15.2% in Model 2. The results also indicate that PRESSURE (F = 3.64; p =
0.032), FOLLOWERSHIP (F = 5.70; p = 0.020), and ACCTEXP (F = 6.38; p = 0.014)
are significantly related to REVISION.7, 8 Specifically, pressure from the CEO increases
the CFOs’ propensity to revise, as expected in H1 (see the contrast testing below for
further analysis of this effect and specific insights into H1 and H3). Effective followers
(who score higher on the followership scale) are less likely to revise their inventory
adjustment. Thus, the Model 2 results indicate a direct effect for followership in resisting
improper CEO pressure. Likewise, CFOs with more accounting experience make smaller
revisions (i.e., provide lower inventory revisions) to their accounting estimates under
pressure, highlighting the importance of accounting experience in resisting CEO pressure.
The ANCOVA results indicate that CSE is not significant (F = 1.35; p = 0.250).9, 10
7

In Model 2, the inventory adjustment recommendations for CFOs who had previously experienced
inappropriate pressure were not significantly different (p = 0.148) than the recommendations of participants
who had no such experience.
8

Including the participants’ views regarding the ethicality and legality of the case as control variables (one
at a time) in Model 2 yields similar results for PRESSURE and FOLLOWERSHIP (ethicality and legality
have p < 0.001), but ACCEXP is then only marginally significant (p = 0.078 and p = 0.063, respectively).
9

The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test provides evidence of heteroskedasticity. As a result, the
REVISION data was converted to ranks in order to perform a non-parametric sensitivity test (e.g., Conover,
1980). The ANCOVA on ranks provides similar results (F = 3.11; p = 0.015), but ACCTEXP is no longer
significant (F = 2.61; p = 0.111).
10

There is a strong, positive correlation between CSE and FOLLOWERSHIP (r = .52; p = 0.01). To assess
possible multicollinearity, I ran the model as a regression (replacing the three-level PRESSURE variable
with two dummy variables, COMPLIANCE and OBEDIENCE). Both COMPLIANCE and OBEDIENCE
are significant (p < 0.03), and the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.47, well below the standard
criterion of 10. Therefore, multicollinearity is not an issue.
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Model 3 examines H4 and H5 by including the interaction effects for followership
and CSE; each variable interacted with PRESSURE. Hypothesis 4 and 5 predicted that
the positive relationship between social influence pressure and CFO revision would be
stronger when follower effectiveness and CSE are lower, respectively. Model 3 is
significant (F = 2.41; p = 0.022). However, PRESSURE (F = 2.12; p = 0.130) and
FOLLOWERSHIP (F = 1.65; p = 0.205) are no longer significant (see comments below
regarding the statistical power of this model). The model’s interaction terms, PRESSURE
X FOLLOWERSHIP (F = 2.15; p = 0.126) and PRESSURE X CSE (F = 0.24; p =
0.784), are not significant.11 Therefore H4 and H5 are not supported. ACCTEXP is the
only variable that remains significant (F = 2.15; p = 0.012).
Given the changes to the significance of variables with the addition of the
interaction terms in Model 3, it is appropriate to assess the power of the models.
Observed power for the overall model, which is adequate (Hair et al., 2010) in both
models as shown in Table 5, increased from .872 in Model 2 to .880 in Model 3.
However, observed power for the PRESSURE variable decreased from .650 in Model 2
to .416 in Model 3. The FOLLOWERSHIP variable had similar drop in power from .652
to .243. In summary, the addition of the interaction terms in Model 3 hurts the model’s
power and produces insignificant results.12

11

The interaction terms in Model 3 also are insignificant if they are included in the model one at a time.
CSE also is insignificant in Model 2 when each variable is included in the model one at a time.
12

Supplemental analysis was conducted in order to assess whether the sample size affected the sensitivity
(power) of the results. Sample doubling yields highly significant results for both Model 2 (F = 7.01; p <
0.001) and Model 3 (F = 5.26; p < 0.001). Additionally, PRESSURE X FOLLOWERSHIP becomes
significant (F = 4.68; p < 0.011). This suggests that the insignificant findings for H4 reflect small sample
size rather than small effect size. This sample size effect is present despite sample cell sizes of greater than
the recommended 20 per cell (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).
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The effect size for each of the models is presented in Table 5. Specifically,
Cohen’s f = .348 for Model 2, indicating an effect size between medium (.25) and large
(.40) (UCLA, 2013a).

Table 5. ANCOVA results for REVISION a (n = 66 CFOs)
Variable
PRESSURE (H1, H3)
FOLLOWERSHIP
CSE
PRESSURE X FOLLOWERSHIP (H4)
PRESSURE X CSE (H5)
ACCTEXP
Model

Model 1
F
p
2.64
0.080

2.64

0.080

Adj. R2
Effect size – Cohen’s f c
Observed Power - Model b
Observed Power - PRESSURE c
a

b
c

4.8%
.289
.506
.506

Model 2
F
p
3.64
0.032
5.70
0.020
1.35
0.250
6.38

0.014

Model 3
F
p
2.12
0.130
1.65
0.204
0.77
0.384
2.15
0.126
0.25
0.784
6.76
0.012

3.34

0.010

2.41

15.2%
.348
.872
.650

0.022
16.4%
.275
.880
.416

The dependent variable measures the CFOs’ willingness to revise their initial inventory recommendation
on a scale of 0 = no change from CFO’s initial recommendation of $2 million to 100 = revise adjustment
to $0, with a midpoint of 50 = revise adjustment to $1 million to meet earnings target.
Partial eta squared.
Computed using alpha = .05.

All p-values are two-tailed.
Variable Definitions:
PRESSURE = manipulated variable (1 = control 2 = compliance, or 3 = obedience);
FOLLOWERSHIP = total score on the 20-item Followership questionnaire, with each item measured
on 7-point scale (possible total score range 20 - 140);
CSE = total score on the 12-item Core Self Evaluations scale, with each item
measured on a 5-point scale (possible total score range 12 - 60); and
ACCTEXP = Natural log of years of accounting experience.

Contrast Testing
In order to directly test H1 and H3, planned contrast tests are run (UCLA, 2013b).
Table 6 presents the results for contrast testing based on Model 2 (using Model 3 yields
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similar results). As predicted, the planned contrast test results in Table 6 reveal
significant differences (p < 0.05) between the no pressure and obedience pressure groups
(H1a) and no pressure and compliance pressure groups (H1b). Although not specifically
hypothesized, the planned contrast test results also reveal a significant (p = 0.014)
difference between the no pressure condition and the average of obedience and
compliance pressure conditions. The planned contrasts reveal no significant difference (p
= 0.654) between the obedience versus compliance pressure conditions (H3). Overall, the
contrast testing results provide support for H1a and H1b, but not H3.

Table 6. Results of hypothesis testing: Pressure effects on REVISION a
(Planned contrasts testing based on Model 2 above)
Pressure effects

CSF

Tests of contrasts of individual treatments
No pressure versus obedience pressure (H1a)
No pressure versus compliance pressure (H1b)
Obedience versus compliance pressure (H3)
No pressure versus average of obedience and compliance
a

F

3.06
4.71
0.20
5.07

p-value

0.043*
0.017*
0.654
0.014*

“*” denotes a one-tailed p-value, reflecting the directional prediction in H1a and H1b. The other p-value
is two-tailed to reflect the non-directional H3.

Inventory Adjustment Decision Justifications
Participants were asked to furnish primary justifications for their inventory
adjustment decisions. Table 7 summarizes the CFOs’ explanations, grouped by their
degree of acquiescence to social influence pressure. Panel A provides the primary
justifications from CFOs who complied with the CEO’s directive/request and
recommended an inventory adjustment of $1 million or less in order to meet an earnings
target. A review of the responses for the 10 participants who acquiesced totally indicates
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that most (n = 8) considered the inventory adjustment issue to be subjective or
immaterial. Additionally, several participants felt that it was either too early to tell (n = 2)
or that the original recommendation should be reviewed or it was incomplete (n = 2). In
summary, these CFOs argued that the materiality, subjectivity, or uncertainty of loss
justified postponing an adjustment to inventory.
Panel B provides the primary justifications from the CFOs who recommended a
compromise inventory adjustment amount less than their original recommendation but
greater than the CEO’s directive/request. Similar to the CFOs who acquiesced in Panel A,
some CFOs who compromised felt the original recommendation was incomplete and
should be reviewed (n = 5) or the issue was subjective or immaterial (n = 3). This
similarity is because some CFOs only acquiesced a very small amount (i.e., REVISE < 6
in five cases). Other participants provided justifications more aligned with the views of
CFOs who did not acquiesce at all (i.e., Panel C) by explaining that their initial
recommendation was supported by the evidence (n = 3) and that it is not appropriate to
manage earnings or make decisions based on analysts’ forecasts (n = 3).
Approximately half (n = 21) of the CFOs refused to change their initial inventory
adjustment recommendation at all despite pressure from the CEO (Panel C). The majority
of these CFOs (n = 12) indicated that their original recommendations were supported by
the evidence. Other respondents stated that it is not appropriate to manage earnings or
make decisions based on analysts’ forecasts (n = 7). Five CFOs explained that the CEO
did not offer substantive evidence to support reconsideration, while four CFOs were
guided by personal integrity or certification expectations. Thus, CFOs who held firm to
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Table 7. Justification for revision decision (n = 66 CFOs)
#

Justification

n

Panel A: Total Acquiescence Under Pressure
(n = 10 with change to inventory adjustment recommendation = $1 million or more)
1.
2.
3.

Original estimate is subjective or not material
It is too early to tell. Give it another quarter and consider other factors
Original recommendation was incomplete and should be reviewed

8
2
2

Panel B: Zone of Compromise Under Pressure
(n = 12 with change to inventory adjustment recommendation = $0 < x < $1 million)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Original recommendation was incomplete and should be reviewed
I am confident that my initial recommendation is supported by evidence
It is not appropriate to manage earnings or make decisions based on analysts’ forecast
Original estimate is subjective or not material

5
3
3
3

Panel C: No Acquiescence Under Pressure
(n = 21 with change to inventory adjustment recommendation = $0)
1.
2.
3.
4.

I am confident that my initial recommendation is supported by evidence
It is not appropriate to manage earnings or make decisions based on analysts’ forecast
CEO did not offer substantive evidence to support reconsideration
Personal integrity or certification expectations

12
7
5
4

Panel D: No Pressure Group
(n = 23 with mean change to inventory adjustment recommendation = $98,000)
1.
2.
3.

I am confident that my initial recommendation is supported by evidence
Industry/product/or technology factors dictate treatment
Adjustment is appropriate under GAAP/SOX 404/SEC/ required disclosure

13
8
5

Most of the 66 participants provided multiple reasons for their inventory adjustment decision.
Pressure Response Groups:
Total acquiescence group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of
$2 million to $1 million or less in response to a demand or request by the CEO.
Zone of Compromise group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of
$2 million, but by an amount less than the $1 million change demanded or requested by the
CEO.
No acquiescence group: participants refused to change their initial inventory adjustment
recommendation of $2 million despite a demand or request by the CEO.
No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO.
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their initial recommendation highlighted their confidence in their original evidence-based
decision and their perception that the CEO’s directive/request was not evidence-based.
They were also influenced by their personal integrity and their views regarding earnings
management.
Panel D summarizes the viewpoints of CFOs who were not pressured by the CEO.
Many of the members of the control group also mentioned that they were confident that
their initial recommendation was supported by the evidence (n = 13). Other CFOs felt
that the issue should be guided by either industry or technology factors (n = 8) or by
regulatory or standard-setting body requirements (n = 5). Clearly, without the influence
of social pressure, these CFOs saw the issue as a technical or accounting issue rather than
a subjective or multi-dimensional judgment.
Additional Analyses
Participants were asked two questions to assess their perceptions of how typical
CFOs would respond in a similar situation. The results provide some evidence of a halo
effect. First, participants’ mean inventory adjustment amount for a typical CFO (M =
33.00; SD = 29.86) was greater than their self-assessed mean inventory adjustment (M =
14.67; SD = 26.10). Such difference (M = 18.75; SD = 26.06) was significantly greater
than zero (p < 0.001). Additionally, participants indicated that almost half (M = 44.05;
SD = 30.17) of typical public company CFOs would acquiesce completely and “make a
small enough final inventory adjustment to result in pretax EPS of $1.08 or more”
(untabulated). In contrast, the participants’ responses in Table 3 reveal that only 18% of
the participants indicated that they would completely acquiesce. There were no
significant differences between the pressure groups.
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Table 8 presents the participants’ perceptions of a typical CFO’s mean inventory
adjustment (M = 33.00; SD = 29.86) organized first by pressure treatment group and then
by pressure response group. In the Panel A results by pressure treatment group, the means
for the no pressure (M = 26.17; SD = 23.82), compliance (M = 36.86; SD = 32.40) and
obedience group participants (M = 36.79; SD = 33.31) are all significantly higher than the
CFOs’ mean responses to the question calling for their own inventory adjustment
recommendation (p < 0.001; p < 0.01; and p < 0.05, respectively).
Panel B, Table 8 presents the results for the typical CFOs question organized by
response group. The overall mean response (M = 33.00; SD = 29.86) reflects the CFOs’
judgment as to a typical public company CFO’s inventory revision decision. The typical
CFO’s mean inventory adjustment for CFOs who completely acquiesced to pressure from
the CEO (M = 69.22) was significantly higher (p < 0.001 and p < 0.003, respectively)
than the means for CFOs who did not acquiesce and who compromised (M = 25.90 and
31.18, respectively). In contrast, the mean for the CFOs who compromised (M = 31.18)
was not significantly different (p = 0.627) than the mean for CFOs who did not acquiesce
(M = 30.69). Thus, the results indicate differences among both pressure treatment groups
and pressure response groups in their perceptions of the actions of typical CFOs.13

13

Several prior ethics studies (e.g., Cohen et al., 1993; Lord & DeZoort, 2001) also provide evidence of
self-presentation effects (participants view themselves as less likely to revise in comparison to their peers).
In contrast, other studies do not find evidence of such effects (e.g., Davis et al., 2006).
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics: Typical CFO’s inventory revision (n = 64)
Pressure treatment group

n

Mean
(0-100)

SD
(0-100)

t

Sig.

Panel A: Means of supplemental question regarding typical CFOs by treatment group.
No pressure (control)
Compliance pressure
Obedience pressure
Total

23
22
19
64 a

26.17
36.86
36.79
33.00

23.82
32.40
33.31
29.86

-4.281 b
-3.183 b
-2.594 b
-5.796 b

.000
.004
.018
.000

Pressure response group

n

Mean

SD

t

Sig

t

Sig

Panel B: Means of supplemental question regarding typical CFOs by response group.
No pressure
No acquiescence
Zone of Compromise
Total acquiescence
Total
a
b
c
d

23
21
11
9
64 a

26.17
25.90
31.18
69.22
33.00

23.82
30.69
24.84
24.25
29.86

-.491 c
-3.750 c

.627
.001

-3.444 d

.003

Two CFOs declined to comment on the actions of typical CFOs.
Paired-samples t-test comparing group mean of supplementary question regarding typical CFO’s decision
with primary question calling for their decision.
Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of no acquiescence group.
Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of zone of compromise group.

All p-values are two-tailed.
Pressure Treatment Groups:
No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO.
Compliance pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a request – the
CEO asks the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings
target.
Obedience pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a demand – the CEO
tells the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings target.
Pressure Response Groups:
Total acquiescence group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of
$2 million to $1 million or less in response to a demand or request by the CEO.
Zone of Compromise group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of
$2 million, but by an amount less than the $1 million change demanded or requested by the
CEO.
No acquiescence group: participants refused to change their initial inventory adjustment
recommendation of $2 million despite a demand or request by the CEO.
No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO.
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Responsibility Assessment
Hypothesis 2 predicted that CFOs who revise their initial inventory estimate
under pressure would find themselves less responsible for their decision than CFOs who
do not revise. The responsibility results in Table 9 do not support H2.14 In fact, the 10
CFOs who acquiesced to the CEO’s demand/request assigned directionally more
responsibility to themselves in comparison to the other groups, rather than less as
expected. Thus, although the results contradict obedience theory’s responsibility shifting
prediction, they provide support for Schlenker et al.’s (1994) responsibility theory, which
suggests that perceived responsibility is a function of an individual’s connection to and
identification with a set of policies or standards. As discussed in the subsequent section,
the CFOs’ primary rationalization for assigning primary responsibility was their view of
the CFO’s duties and responsibilities as principal accounting officer and the SOX 302
certification requirements.

14

One respondent’s allocation percentage was changed to reflect his/her clear intention based on the
written response to the open-ended question regarding responsibility (see Table 10). Specifically, the
responsibility allocation of one respondent who wrote, “ultimately, I am responsible” and “the number
should be up to me” was changed from 10% CFO and 80% CEO to 80% CFO and 10% CEO in order to
match the written remarks.
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Table 9. Responsibility assessment: % of responsibility assigned to CFO, CEO, or
others (n = 66) a
Pressure response group

CFO

CSF

CEO

Other b

No pressure

Mean
SD
N

69.3
23.8
23

18.9
16.0
23

11.7
14.9
23

No acquiescence

Mean
SD
N

83.3
25.2
21

9.5
18.2
21

7.1
16.1
21

Zone of compromise

Mean
SD
N

85.4
15.3
12

11.3
15.4
12

3.3
6.5
12

Total acquiescence

Mean
SD
N

86.5
18.6
10

8.0
11.1
10

5.5
9.6
10

a
b

The percentages above reflect the CFOs’ assessment of responsibility for the inventory revision decision
when asked to allocate responsibility to the CFO, CEO, or other.
Most (78.9%) of the nineteen CFOs who allocated a portion of the responsibility to someone other than
the CFO or CEO identified the controller, COO, or sales/marketing director.

Pressure Response Groups:
No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO.
No acquiescence group: participants refused to change their initial inventory adjustment
recommendation of $2 million despite a demand or request by the CEO.
Zone of Compromise group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of
$2 million, but by an amount less than the $1 million change demanded or requested by the
CEO.
Total acquiescence group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of
$2 million to $1 million or less in response to a demand or request by the CEO.

The results in Table 10 summarize the CFOs’ responses to an open-ended
question asking the CFOs to, “Indicate the reason for your decision above regarding
allocating responsibility for the final adjustment.” The results indicate that the recent
SOX certification requirements offer one potential explanation as to why CFOs who
acquiesce to pressure might continue to hold themselves 100% responsible for the
decision. Panel A provides the primary justifications from CFOs who assigned 100% of
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the responsibility for the inventory adjustment decision to the CFO. A review of the
CFOs who accepted all of the responsibility (n = 28) indicates that they were guided
primarily by their view of their responsibility for the financial statements, including the
SOX Section 302 certification requirements. They indicated that the primary reason for
their allocation was the CFO’s ultimate responsibility for the financials as the principal
accounting officer (n = 20). Additionally, participants were guided by their analysis or
the accounting standards (n = 5) or by their SOX certification responsibilities (n = 4).
Panel B provides the primary justifications from the CFOs who assigned at least
75%, but less than 100%, of the responsibility for the inventory adjustment decision to
the CFO (n = 18). Like the CFOs who assigned 100% in Panel A, some CFOs in this
group assigned ultimate responsibility for financial information to the CFO as principal
accounting officer (n = 13). Others in this group also assigned responsibility to the CEO.
For example, five CFOs felt that since the CEO and CFO both certify the financials under
SOX, they should share responsibility. Five others indicated that the CEO should be
consulted in such decisions based on his/her operating knowledge.
Panel C summarizes the views of the CFOs who assigned less than 75% of the
responsibility to the CFO (n = 20). Again, many CFOs in this group mentioned that the
CFO’s role as principal accounting officer was an important factor in their responsibility
assessment (n = 6). Many of the group also felt that the CEO and other company officers
should also be assigned responsibility. Six CFOs in this group indicated that the primary
officers of company should be assigned collective responsibility for the decision. Five
others felt that the CFO should consult with the CEO due to his operating knowledge.
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Table 10. Justification for responsibility assessment (n = 66 CFOs)
#

Justification

n

Panel A: CFO fully responsible group
(n = 28 with responsibility to CFO = 100%)
1.
2.
3.

CFO as principal accounting officer has ultimate responsibility for financials
Information/numbers/analysis/accounting standards are basis for the decision
CFO certifies under SOX / CFO and CEO both sign, but CFO has ultimate responsibility

20
5
4

Panel B: CFO median responsible group
(n = 18 with responsibility to CFO = 75% < x < 100%)
1.
2.
3.

CFO as principal accounting officer has ultimate responsibility for financials
CEO and CFO both sign under SOX so responsibility is shared
CFO primarily responsible but should consult with CEO due to his operating knowledge

13
5
5

Panel C: CFO least responsible group
(n = 20 with responsibility to CFO of less than 75%)
1.
2.
3.

CFO as principal accounting officer has ultimate responsibility for financials
Primary officers of company have collective responsibility for decision
CFO primarily responsible but should consult with CEO due to his operating knowledge

6
6
5

Most of the 66 participants provided multiple reasons for their inventory adjustment decision.
Responsibility Assessment Groups:
CFO fully responsible group: participants assigned 100% of the responsibility for their ultimate
inventory adjustment decision to the CFO.
CFO median responsible group: participants assigned less than 100%, but at least 75% of the
responsibility for their ultimate inventory adjustment decision to the CFO.
CFO least responsible group: participants assigned less than 75% of the responsibility for their
ultimate inventory adjustment decision to the CFO.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Through an experiment, this study examines the influence of social influence
pressure on CFO judgments. Consistent with obedience and compliance theory, CEO
pressure significantly increased the CFOs’ willingness to revise an accounting estimate
by revising their recommended inventory adjustment. The results also reveal two
variables that influence the effect of pressure. CFOs with more years of accounting
experience and CFOs who score high on the effective follower scale are less likely to
revise their initial adjustment. In contrast, the results did not reveal a significant effect for
CSE, or any moderating effects of followership or CSE. Interestingly, in contrast to the
tenets of obedience theory, individuals who acquiesced to the CEO did not hold
themselves less responsible for their actions than those individuals who did not
acquiesce.
This study’s findings have important implications for researchers, practitioners,
and policymakers. From a research perspective, the study provides insight into the
strength of social influence pressure on financial statement quality in a top management
team setting. Specifically, the results highlight the susceptibility of public company CFOs
to both obedience and compliance pressure. The results suggest that more subtle forms of
pressure (i.e., compliance pressure) generate a response similar to obedience pressure
despite a lack of perceived pressure on the part of the CFOs. This study responds to the
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Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s (COSO) call for
a better understanding of the factors that cause an individual to set aside a personal set of
beliefs to engage in fraud, including the attitudes and rationalizations that result in the
decision to engage in fraudulent misreporting, and the psyche of individuals involved in
fraudulent reporting (Beasley et al., 2010). Additionally, the study’s exploration of
followership suggests an area for future research.
From a practitioner standpoint, the study has implications for potential
improvements to the effectiveness of CFOs as monitors of financial statements. As TMT
members, CFOs may be in a unique position to “Just Say No” and contribute to the
monitoring function from the inside by offering thoughtful dissent. Exemplary followers,
when needed, fulfill an ethical watchdog role (Kelley, 1998; Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007).
From a policy viewpoint, the findings suggest that CFOs’ vulnerability to pressure
is an important detractor of financial statement quality (confirming Baird and Zelin’s,
2009, results with a student sample). If CEOs exert undue influence on CFOs, then
corporate governance policies and practices should be revised to improve CFO
independence and alleviate the pressure. The study also provides evidence of the high
level of perceived responsibility on the part of CFOs as a result of such initiatives as SOX
Section 302 certification requirements. Further improvements to corporate governance
practices should be adopted, including enhancing audit committee interaction with and/or
supervision of the CFO position, and encouraging external auditors to proactively
develop tools to recognize, respond, and potentially alleviate such pressure (by acting as
an advisor or sounding board to CFOs under pressure).
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This study is subject to several limitations. First, there are inherent differences in
the realism and power found in artificial pressure treatments and a natural setting; realworld pressures would be more powerful and intense than the case’s experimental setting
(DeZoort and Lord, 1997). Thus, the case presents a conservative measure of the effect of
social influence pressure – in this setting, it is costless for the CFOs to ignore pressure
from the CEO. Second, CFOs are likely to have a wider range of options available when
encountering pressure than the ones presented in the study. For instance, actual CFO
decisions may be affected by conversations with colleagues and superiors or adjusted by
persuading their superior to modify the requested action. Third, the study measures
participants’ intended behavior (rather than their actual behavior). Although intention
may predict or infer action (Ajzen, 1991), there still remains a degree of uncertainty
regarding whether participants would behave differently when faced with the actual
pressures. Fourth, since this case involves ethical decision-making, it may be particularly
susceptible to “social desirability” or “halo” effects to the extent that participants may
respond so as to present themselves more favorably rather than in accordance with their
true feelings. Although the research design attempted to reduce this bias, it may not have
completely eliminated such effects. The limitations inherent in the experimental
condition make the test very conservative and biased against the hypothesized findings.
Thus, the strength of the results gives support to the importance of the topic.
Financial statement misreporting remains an important topic for regulators and
researchers. Attempts to identify behavioral factors motivating dysfunctional CFO
activity are in their infancy. I encourage additional research into social influence pressure
and its effect on CFOs including identifying personality factors that influence reactions to
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pressure, isolating effective governance measures to support CFO resistance to pressure,
improving auditors’ tools to assess managements’ integrity and susceptibility to pressure.
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Appendix
(excluding Followership and CSE materials)
Dana R. Hermanson
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise
Director of Research – Corporate Governance Center
Kennesaw State University
dhermans@kennesaw.edu
770.423.6077

September 17, 2012
<<Title>> <<First Name>> <<Middle Name>> <<Last Name>>
<<Position>>
<<Company>>
<<Bus Street 1>>
<<Bus Street 2>>
<<City>>, <<State>> <<Zip>>
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>:
As you know, the role of Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is quite complex and often challenging. My
doctoral student, Carol Bishop, is working on her dissertation, in which she is seeking to better understand
CFOs’ judgments. Dr. Todd DeZoort (The University of Alabama) and I are overseeing Carol’s research,
and we are both experienced accounting researchers who have performed numerous studies sponsored by
leading accounting and corporate governance organizations.
You are among a select group of CFOs we are contacting to ask for assistance with Carol’s dissertation
research. Your participation is very important to the success of the project and to gain a better
understanding of the issues and challenges that CFOs confront in practice. We certainly hope you will
contribute a few minutes of your time to help us in this area.
We ask that you read the enclosed hypothetical case and respond to all of the questions that follow using
the directions provided in the case. This is not a test, and there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. We are
interested in your candid views. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link
you to your responses, and all data will be reported in the aggregate only. The project has been approved by
our Institutional Review Board.
Completion of the case should take approximately 25 minutes, and we will be happy to recognize your
participation with a contribution to the charity of your choice. If you have any questions or would like to
receive a summary of the results, please either email Carol at bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu or me at
dhermans@kennesaw.edu. Thank you very much for your support of this research.
Sincerely,

Dana R. Hermanson, Ph.D.
Enclosures: Case, Return Envelope
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Dana R. Hermanson
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise
Director of Research – Corporate Governance Center
Kennesaw State University
dhermans@kennesaw.edu
770.423.6077

SECOND REQUEST – October 19, 2012
<<Title>> <<First Name>> <<Middle Name>> <<Last Name>>
<<Position>>
<<Company>>
<<Bus Street 1>>
<<Bus Street 2>>
<<City>>, <<State>> <<Zip>>
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>:
If you responded to our previous mailing in September 2012, thank you very much for your help, and
please disregard this letter. If you did not respond, we ask that you please consider assisting us with this
important research by taking approximately 25 minutes to complete the enclosed case. We will conclude
the data collection by November 20, 2012.
As you know, the role of Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is quite complex and often challenging. My
doctoral student, Carol Bishop, is working on her dissertation, in which she is seeking to better understand
CFOs’ judgments. Dr. Todd DeZoort (The University of Alabama) and I are overseeing Carol’s research,
and we are both experienced accounting researchers who have performed numerous studies sponsored by
leading accounting and corporate governance organizations.
You are among a select group of CFOs we are contacting to ask for assistance with Carol’s dissertation
research. Your participation is very important to the success of the project and to gain a better
understanding of the issues and challenges that CFOs confront in practice. We certainly hope you will
contribute a few minutes of your time to help us in this area.
We ask that you read the enclosed hypothetical case and respond to all of the questions that follow using
the directions provided in the case. This is not a test, and there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. We are
interested in your candid views. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link
you to your responses, and all data will be reported in the aggregate only. The project has been approved by
our Institutional Review Board.
We will be happy to recognize your participation with a contribution to the charity of your choice. If you
have any questions or would like to receive a summary of the results, please either email Carol at
bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu or me at dhermans@kennesaw.edu. Thank you very much for your
support of this research.
Sincerely,

Dana R. Hermanson, Ph.D.
Enclosures: Case, Return Envelope
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RESEARCH STUDY:
CFO Decision-Making
This study is part of my research requirement to earn my Doctorate in Business Administration
(DBA) at Kennesaw State University. The purpose of the study is to gain insight into the
decision-making processes used by Chief Financial Officers (or similarly titled position).
Your position and expertise make your opinions and evaluations very important to this study. We
will be happy to make a contribution to the charity of your choice in appreciation for your
participation. The study consists of a hypothetical case and follow-up questions. The estimated
time for completion is approximately 25 minutes.
Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your consent (or skip
a question) at any time without penalty. Additionally, your individual results will be anonymous
(all data will be reported in the aggregate only). There are no known risks involved due to
participation in this study. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in this study.
If you have any questions about the study you can contact me using the information below.
Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the
oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities
should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain
Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (678) 797-2268.
Thank you in advance for your time and assistance. Your response is greatly appreciated.

Carol C. Bishop, CPA
bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu
(229) 881-7693
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INSTRUCTIONS
1. The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case that includes summary background
information and questions for you to answer.
2. It is critical that you attempt to put yourself in the following situation as the company’s CFO
and answer all of the questions as candidly as possible without consulting anyone else.
3. Please complete the materials/pages in the order given without looking ahead through the
pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a way that
reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable response, please complete all
of the questions if possible. You will have an opportunity at the end of the case to provide
any clarifications or comments you would like to make.
4. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link you to your
responses on the following pages, and all data will be reported in the aggregate only.
RESEARCHER
Carol C. Bishop, CPA
Columbus State University
Doctoral Student - Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University
bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu
(229) 881-7693
Dissertation Committee

Dana R. Hermanson (Chair)
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair &
Professor
Kennesaw State University
dhermans@kennesaw.edu
(770) 423-6077

F. Todd DeZoort
Professor &
Professional Advisory Board Fellow
The University of Alabama
tdezoort@cba.ua.edu
(205) 348-6694
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Please review the case information below and answer the questions that follow.
I. Background
Please assume you are a licensed CPA employed as the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Ace
Cellular Telephone, Inc. (ACT) for the past three years. ACT is a mid-size publicly traded
company that manufactures and distributes cellular telephone accessories to retailers throughout
the eastern half of the United States. ACT’s management recognizes that heavy competition in
the industry and frequent technological advances make inventory obsolescence and inventory
valuation key business and accounting issues.
ACT’s relevant organizational structure is summarized below:

CEO
(Chris)

COO

CFO
(You)
Controller

ACT’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chris Smith, has been with the company for the past five
years. You report directly to Chris, who completes your performance evaluations and determines
your annual raises. Since you joined the company, you have had a successful, effective working
relationship with Chris, with no significant disagreements. As CFO, your current areas of
responsibility include: financial reporting, investing, capital structure, long-term planning, and
budget recommendations. In addition, you are responsible for enforcing company-wide fiscal
policies.
II. Financial Information
ACT is in the fourth quarter of its fiscal year. Relevant estimated year-end balances are presented
below:
Sales
Total assets
Inventories
Net earnings

$650 million
$550 million
$188 million
$55 million

Pretax earnings per share (EPS) as currently stated
Consensus analysts’ pretax EPS forecast

$1.10 per share
$1.08 per share

ACT’s pretax EPS has increased by approximately 6% in each of the last three years, similar to
the industry average. Consistent with this trend, analysts’ pretax EPS forecast of $1.08 reflects an
increase of 6% over the previous year’s EPS. ACT’s stock price typically reacts negatively when
favorable trends in financial results are interrupted.
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III. Issue before the CFO
During the fourth quarter of the current fiscal year, one of ACT’s closest competitors introduced a
product that is technologically superior to and less expensive than similar products currently in
ACT’s inventory. The competitor’s newly introduced product is likely to reduce the demand and
sales price for similar products currently in ACT’s inventory.
Based on estimates of future customer demand and sales prices, you have decided to make an
adjustment to the inventory valuation. You review the following factors to develop an estimate of
the net realizable value of inventory: a slowdown in new orders, an increase in inventory levels in
comparison to sales levels, the rapid rate of technological change in the industry, and an
evaluation of the reliability and technical advantages of the competitor’s new product.
Based on your initial assessment, you tentatively propose to write down inventory by $2 million
to a net realizable value of $186 million (an adjustment of 1 percent of inventory value). Relative
to preadjusted balances, your proposed adjustment of $2 million is approximately 3.6 percent of
pretax income, 0.3 percent of sales, and 0.36 percent of total assets. If your adjustment were made
in full, pretax EPS would be reduced from $1.10 to $1.06.
After considering the foregoing information, you are comfortable with the reasonableness of this
initial proposed adjustment (and the resulting revised EPS figure), but you recognize the
considerable degree of judgment and subjectivity involved in developing the initial adjustment.
Now, you are considering the final adjustment to be recorded.
Control Group (No Pressure)
Chris, the company’s CEO, meets with you to discuss the year-end financial reporting results.
After you explain the effect of your proposed inventory write-down, which would reduce EPS
from $1.10 to $1.06, Chris assures you that ultimately the inventory write-down decision is yours
to make.
Compliance Pressure from CEO Condition
Chris, the company’s CEO, meets with you to discuss the year-end financial reporting results.
After you explain the effect of your proposed inventory write-down, which would reduce EPS
from $1.10 to $1.06, Chris emphasizes the extreme importance of meeting the current year’s
earnings target of $1.08 and asks you to change your proposed inventory write-down. Chris says,
“If we make this entry, it will just kill our company. Will you please go back and fix this now so
that we meet our target?”
Obedience Pressure from CEO Condition
Chris, the company’s CEO, meets with you to discuss the year-end financial reporting results.
After you explain the effect of your proposed inventory write-down, which would reduce EPS
from $1.10 to $1.06, Chris emphasizes the extreme importance of meeting the current year’s
earnings target of $1.08 and tells you to change your proposed inventory write-down. Chris says,
“If we make this entry, it will just kill our company. I am telling you to go back and fix this now
so that we meet our target.”
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Please answer the following questions based on the information in the case above. You
may refer back to the case information when responding. Indicate your answer with a
slash on the line.
1. Based on the information presented, indicate below the likely final inventory adjustment
and pretax EPS you would record.

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
$2 Million Adjustment
------------------

$1.06 EPS
------------------

Your Initial Adjustment

$1 Million Adjustment

No Inventory Adjustment

------------------

------------------

$1.08 EPS

$1.10 EPS

------------------

Analysts’ Forecast

------------------

EPS Before Any Adjustment

2. Please list at least two primary reasons in order of importance for your decision above.

3. How would you assign responsibility for your final inventory adjustment above?
You (the CFO)
CEO (Chris)
Others (please describe)
TOTAL

_______% Responsible
_______% Responsible
_______% Responsible
100 %

4. Please indicate the reasons for your decision above regarding allocating responsibility for the
final adjustment among the CFO (you), the CEO (Chris), or others.

5. Based on the information presented, indicate below the likely final inventory adjustment
and pretax EPS that a typical public company CFO would record in this situation.

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
$2 Million Adjustment
------------------

$1.06 EPS
------------------

Your Initial Adjustment

$1 Million Adjustment
------------------

$1.08 EPS
------------------

Analysts’ Forecast

No Inventory Adjustment
------------------

$1.10 EPS
------------------

EPS Before Any Adjustment

6. Please indicate at least two primary reasons in order of importance for a typical public
company CFO’s decision above.

7. Based on the information provided, what percentage of typical public company CFOs
would make a small enough final inventory adjustment to result in pretax EPS of $1.08 or
more?
%
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Please answer the remaining questions without referring back to the case materials.
1. In this case, which of the following reflects the CEO's communication to you regarding the
final inventory adjustment (choose one)?
__ The CEO, Chris, said that ultimately the inventory write-down decision is yours to make.
__ The CEO, Chris, asked you to please change your proposed inventory write-down.
__ The CEO, Chris, told you to change your proposed inventory write-down.

|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

2. How realistic do you find this case?
(Indicate with a slash on the line)

Not at all
Realistic

Very
Realistic

|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

3. How understandable do you find this case?

Not at all
Understandable
4. If the situation described in this case were real,
how much pressure would you feel to record
a smaller final inventory adjustment (smaller
than the $2 million initial adjustment)?

Very
Understandable

|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
None

A Great
Deal

|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

5. In this case, do you believe it is unethical
for the CFO to record a smaller final
inventory adjustment (smaller than the
$2 million initial adjustment)?

Completely
Unethical

6. In this case, do you believe it is illegal
for the CFO to record a smaller final
inventory adjustment (smaller than the
$2 million initial adjustment)?

Completely
Illegal

Completely
Ethical

|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Completely
Legal

7. Have you ever actually been pressured by anyone to improperly manipulate the financial
statements?
___ Yes, if yes, by whom (person’s title within the organization)? ________________
___ No
Compliance (obedience) conditions only

8. If you were faced with this situation in practice
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
how likely would you be to report the CEO’s
Very
Very
request (order) for you to “go back and fix
Unlikely
Likely
this now so that we meet our target”?
9. If you decided to report the CEO’s request (directive), to whom would you most likely report
(check only one)?
___ Board of Directors (as a whole)
___ Internal Auditor
___ Chairman of the Board
___ Whistleblower Hotline
___ Audit Committee
___ Others (please indicate)_____________
___ External Auditor
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Please respond to the following demographic questions. These will be used only to
analyze the results, not to identify any participant.
1. What position or title do you hold in your organization (check only one)?
___ CFO
___ VP of Finance
___ Controller
___ Treasurer
___ Chief Accounting Officer
___ Other
2. How much experience do you have in your current position? ___________ years
3. How much experience have you had in public accounting? ___________ years
4. How much experience have you had as an accountant? ___________ years
5. Please indicate below any professional certifications you have (check all that apply).
___ Certified Financial Manager (CFM)
___ Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA)
___ Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
___ Other _____________________
___ Certified Management Accountant (CMA)
6. What is your highest educational degree earned (check only one)?
___ Bachelors
___ PhD/DBA
___ Masters
___ Other
___ JD
7. What is your age? ___________ years
8. What is your gender? ______________
Finally, please provide the following information about the company where you are
currently employed. This information will be used to analyze responses by company
size and industry. Again, your responses will remain strictly confidential.
1. Please indicate the primary industry in which your company operates: __________________
2. Please indicate your company’s approximate annual revenue:
___ Less than $250 million
___ $500 million to $999 million
___ $250 to $499 million
___ $1 billion or more
3. Please provide any additional comments about the issues examined in this case.

Thank you for your participation. By taking time to share your thoughts and opinions
about the challenges faced by CFOs, you have contributed to research in this important
area. If you would like a summary copy of the study’s results, please email the researcher at
bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu. As a token of appreciation, we will make a contribution to the
charity of your choice. Please indicate your preference below:
___ American Cancer Society
___ American Red Cross
___ Habitat for Humanity

___ United Way
___ Other _____________________

	
  

